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1CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Microeconomics is a branch of economics which studies how individual agent behaves un-
like macroeconomics which studies the behavior of several agents. By focusing on the behavior
of individual sole microeconomics can provide insights and solutions to market failures. This
feature has made this branch of economics increasingly important. Even the modern macroe-
conomics is built upon microeconomics foundation.
This three essays thesis applies microeconomics to answer key issues on agriculture and
the management of natural resources. The first essay examines the question of asymmetric
information introduced by the emergence of the genetically modified technology in the food
system. The second essay looks at the problem of moral hazard in the financing of the rural
population in developing countries by supermarket. While these two essays use a theoretical
framework to provide insights on concrete issue, the last essay not only develops a microeco-
nomics conceptual framework but also confronts it with real data to understand the behavior
of fishermen. In doing so this thesis shows how powerful microeconomics is in understanding
the behavior of economic agent and in providing insights to a wide range of question.
Agriculture and the management of natural resources are one the major challenge facing
the world in the 21st century.
Increasing consumers concerns toward food safety combined with the introduction of new
technology have led to a profound transformation and a differentiation of the marketing chan-
nels for food and agricultural products. Furthermore different national regulatory responses
to food concerns have entailed a proliferation of food standards and emphasized this phe-
nomenon. Discrepancy in food standard impedes the world trade of agricultural products.
This asymmetric information problem is a contentious issue in policy forum across the world.
2In particular regulatory responses to the products of the biotechnology have been subject to
a lot of controversy from both sides of the Atlantic. While the European Union advocates
mandatory labeling based on its precautionary principle, the United State based on the prin-
ciple of substantive equivalence has argued that there is no need for labeling of these products.
The first essay of this paper using a microeconomic model of product differentiation addresses
this issue.
The second essay deals with the financing of rural population in developing countries by
modern retail chains. Over the last two decades intense competition in developed countries and
urbanization in developing countries have led supermarkets to spread in developing countries.
The entry of supermarkets in these countries has implication for the entire marketing channel
from producer to consumer. In particular to procure the supermarket farmers need to make a
substantial up-front investment. There is an intense debate in the literature on whether such
investment will exclude or not the smallholders from the marketing channel. The second essay
provides a theoretical framework of supermarket procurement organization to understand the
implications of this organization on farmers participation in the marketing channel. In doing
so this essay fills a theoretical gap in this literature essentially descriptive.
The last essay is concerned with the management of natural resources, especially fisheries.
The observed depletion of fish stocks shows the importance to improve the management of
fisheries. In the management of fisheries economists and ecologists have taken two different
strategies. While economists focus on economic behavior and make simplistic assumptions
about the evolution of fish stocks, ecologists have focused on modeling the complexity of the
environment of the fishery and ignored the behavioral response of fishermen. Nevertheless
the management of fisheries is complex and requires the understanding not only of economic
behavior but also of the dynamic of the ecosystem surrounding the fishery. Using recent
development in micro econometrics, the last essay of this dissertation provides a more general
approach for the management of fisheries. This approach takes simultaneously into account the
change in not only environmental but also economics and regulatory conditions surrounding
the fishery.
3CHAPTER 2. STRATEGIC RESPONSE TO GMOs BY GM-FREE
COUNTRIES
Modified from a paper published in the Eureopean Review of Agricultural Economics
Veyssiere Luc
2.1 Abstract
This article examines the dilemma of a large exporting Country for an agricultural product
which has to determine whether to approve or not the products of the biotechnology with
or without a labeling regime. In doing so this paper makes two points. First the approval
decision of the products of the biotechnology is specific to the labeling regime. While the
products of the GM technology should be approved under a labeling regime, in absence of
labeling requirements they should not be authorized. Second the incapacity to protect the
innovator rents can prevent the approval of the products of the biotechnology.
2.2 Introduction
Regulatory responses to the products of the biotechnology have been subject to a lot of
controversy from both sides of the Atlantic. While the European Union advocates manda-
tory labeling based on its precautionary principle, the United State based on the principle of
substantive equivalence has argued that there is no need for labeling of these products1.
1See Sheldon (2004) for a comprehensive review of the policy debate between the EU and the US on the
regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). On the labeling of GM products see also Caswell (1998),
Runge and Jackson (2000), Crespi and Marette (2003), Fulton and Giannakas (2004), Lapan and Moschini (2004)
and Veyssiere and Giannakas (2006). Finally on labeling of GM and organic products see Moschini, Bulut and
Cembalo (2005) and Giannakas and Yannaka (2006).
4Despite the controversy surrounding agricultural biotechnology, the adoption rates of its
products have been remarkable. Similarly remarkable has been the concentration of Genetically
Modified (GM) production in a small number of large producing countries (James, 2005). As
illustrated by the recent debate on the fate of the GM technology in Brazil, a country’s attitude
towards agricultural biotechnology is shaped to a great degree by a trade off between the
expected agronomic benefits from the producer-oriented, first generation of GM crops, and the
loss of access to markets with high consumer opposition to GM food products (The Economist,
2003 (a)).
There is little debate that adoption of the new technology and its labeling is an impor-
tant issue for large exporting countries of agricultural products. Interestingly, despite the
importance of this problem, most adoption studies have focused on closed economies and the
question of adoption with or without a labeling regime by a large exporting country of agri-
cultural products remains open2.
The purpose of this paper is to understand and examine the determinants of the approval
of the products of the biotechnology. In particular, the paper analyzes and compares the effects
of alternative national regulatory decisions on approval and labeling of GM products by a GM
free producing country that competes with a GM producing region for access to a world market
for an agricultural product.
This study builds on the work by Veyssiere and Giannakas (2006) that analyzes the strategic
interactions in labeling decision by GM producing countries in a multicountry context. Un-
like Veyssiere and Giannakas (2006), however, our study explicitly accounts for the strategic
approval of the products of the biotechnology by a GM-free country.
Furthermore while the focus of this paper and Veyssiere and Giannakas (2006) is on the
contentious issue of approval and labeling of GM products, they are not the only factor affect-
ing the development of global market for GM crops and products. Protection of intellectual
property rights (IPRs) as well as the costs for regulatory approval are also endogenous to the
2To our knowledge, sole Sobolevsky Moschini and Lapan (2005) have examined the effects of approval or
not of the product of the biotechnology in an open economy. However their analysis focuses essentially on the
impacts on trade of differing national policy for the products of the biotechnology and no specific reason to
support approval rather than a ban of the GM technology were advanced.
5various countries and can affect the potential of agricultural biotechnology. For developing
countries these issues are of crucial importance. Since their incapacity to enforce IPRs due to
limited technical and financial capacities, may also limit their regulatory approach toward the
products of the biotechnology.
To address these issues the framework develops by Giannakas (2002) in a small economy is
extended to a large economy to illustrate the effects of enforcement of IPRs on the approval
and labeling decision of the products of the biotechnology.
The most striking result of our analysis is that approval decision appear specific to the
labeling regime. Under the condition favorable to a labeling regime a country should favor
approval of the GM technology while under the condition favorable to a no labeling regime
one country should not authorize the marketing of the GM technology.
Also interesting is that a large economy has in general an incentive to enforce its IPRs. This
result is in sharp contrast with the analysis of enforcement of IPRs by Giannakas (2002) for a
small economy and has strong implications for the regulatory decision toward the products of
the biotechnology of countries without the capacity to enforce IPRs. In particular imperfect
enforcement of IPRs can prevent a country from authorizing the marketing of the products of
the biotechnology.
The article is organized as follow. The first section discusses the methodology and as-
sumptions employed in our analysis. The second section develops a stylized three region trade
model with heterogeneous consumers and producers. The third section examines the approval
and labeling decision of the products of the biotechnology. The next section analyses the
enforcement IPRs and its implications. The last section concludes the article.
2.3 Methodology and Assumptions
This article develops a stylized trade framework. In this stylized trade framework a supplying
country (named hereafter Country 1) is competing with a producing region for access to a
world market for an agricultural product. The producing region represents the rest of the
producing countries (named hereafter the Rest Of the World: ROW). The ROW is assumed to
6have approved the product of the biotechnology without any labeling requirement. Producers
in both Country 1 and the ROW are assumed to be heterogeneous in terms of the net returns
perceived for the different crops. To producers in both Country 1 and the ROW, a set of foreign
innovating companies (named hereafter Innovator) are supplying an official GM technology
(when approved), while a black market provides smuggled GM seeds to producers (even if
not approved). IPRs create economic incentives for research and development by making the
innovator the residual claimant of the benefits associated with the new technology. In general
infringement of IPRs takes the form of smuggling of illegal GM seeds from a black market by
farmers3. Finally, on the world market, heterogeneous consumers in terms of preference toward
the conventional and GM products make their purchasing decisions, observing the price and
the nature of the products supplied.
The focus of our analysis is on the Policy decision of Country 1. This decision is modeled
as a two-period sequential game between Country 1, producers and consumers. In the first
stage of the game Country 1 determines its agricultural Policy orientation. In the second stage,
observing Country 1 decision, consumers and producers make their purchasing and planting
decisions, respectively. Country 1 can either approve or not approve the products of the
biotechnology and impose or not a labeling regime. As a result four distinct policies emerge:
Policy 1 : The GM technology is not authorized and there is no labeling requirement for
agricultural products. Since no country labels its products. GM and conventional products
are marketed together as a non-labeled good. Given that GM products are credence goods,
consumers cannot observe the (GM or conventional) nature of the product supplied.
Policy 2 : The GM technology is not authorized and the labeling of agricultural products
is mandatory. In that case two separate supply channels one for non-labeled product (supplied
by the ROW) and one for product labeled as GM free (supplied by Country 1) will emerge.
Policy 3 : The GM technology is authorized and there is no labeling requirement for agri-
cultural products. As in Policy 1 only a non-labeled product will be supplied to the world
3For instance Indian agricultural minister Sharad Pawar recently admitted in parliament that there is a
flourishing illegal market in GM cotton seeds, strengthening allegations by the industry that more than half of
all the GM cotton now growing in the country is from unapproved varieties (Jayaraman, 2004).
7market.
Policy 4 : The GM technology is authorized and the labeling of the agricultural products
is mandatory. Under this Policy, there are three products supplied to the market: the GM-
labeled product (supplied by Country 1), the non-labeled product (supplied by Country 2),
and the conventional-labeled product (supplied by Country 1).
It is important to understand that while the Policy regime in the ROW is fixed (Approval
and No labeling of the GM products: Policy 3) Country 1’s Policy decision will affect the
nature of its supply as well as the nature of the supply to the world market.
This set of stylized policies captures the great variety of regulations towards GM products
observed around the world. As previously mentioned regulations towards the products of the
biotechnology are motivated by two distinct approaches: the precautionary principle and the
principle of substantive equivalence. The US regulation based on the principle of substantive
equivalence does not require any labeling requirement for the products of the biotechnology.
Such policy can be captured in our model by Policy 3 and is currently followed by not only the
US but also Argentina and Canada. On the other hands Country following the precautionary
principle have either authorize the marketing of the products of the biotechnology under a
mandatory labeling regime (i.e. Policy 4) or impose a moratorium on these products (i.e.
Policy 1). Mandatory labeling policies vary widely in terms of the purity of the GM free
product. For instance the EU requires the labeling of GM food and GM ingredients with a
0.9% tolerance level for the adventious presence of GM crops. Australia and New Zealand have
mandatory labeling policies at the 1% level of GM ingredient; Japan requires GM food labeling
at the 5% level and South Korea has a 3% mandatory requirements. Finally moratoriums of
the products of the biotechnology are still in vigor in for instance South Africa, Thailand
and Romania (for extensive details on worldwide GM regulations see Center for Food Safety
(2006)). Note that to our knowledge no country has imposed a moratorium on GM products
along with a labeling regime for its agricultural products i.e. Policy 2.
Given that Country 1 is a producing country, while making its policy choice its objective is
to maximize aggregate producer welfare. Therefore to understand its Policy decision, Country
81 level of aggregate producer welfare has to be systematically derived for each Policy.
2.4 The Model
This section presents the methods used to derive aggregate producer welfare under each Policy.
For illustration these methods are applied to Policy 4 (Approval and Labeling) that provides
the most complex and richest Policy environment.4.
2.4.1 Supply Side
The production decision of heterogeneous farmers in terms of the net return for different crops
is modeled via a framework similar to Fulton and Keyowski (1999); Giannakas (2002) and
Chattopadhyay and Horbulyk (2004).
2.4.1.1 Production Decisions in Country 1
Let A ∈
[
0, A
]
denotes the attribute that differentiates farmers. For tractability, farmers
are assumed uniformly distributed between the polar values of A and produce at most one
unit. Under Policy 4, farmers in Country 1 are left with the choice to either grow a labeled-
conventional crop, a GM-labeled crop or an alternative crop. To each crop a producer with
differentiating attribute A associates the following per unit net returns:
• pi4gm1 = P 4gm − wgm1 + α1A If one unit of GM crop is produced with official seeds
• pi4t1 = P 4t − wlt1 + β1A If one unit of conventional crop is produced
• pia1 = χ1A If one unit of alternative crop is produced
In the above equations, P 4gm and P
4
t stand for the per unit price of labeled-GM and labeled-
conventional crops under Policy 4, respectively. The parameters wlt1 and wgm1 represent the
per unit base cost associated with the production of conventional and GM crops, respectively.
While the conventional crop receives a price premium (i.e. P 4t > P
4
gm); to capture the producer
orientation of the first generation of GM products it is more expensive to produce than its GM
4the author.
9counterpart (i.e. wgm < wt). Finally α1, β1 and χ1 stand for non negative profitability factors
associated with the production of GM, conventional and alternative crops, respectively. It is
assumed that χ1 > β1 > α1 > 0. To simplify notations, let define the difference γ1 = χ1 − β1
and φ1 = β1−α1 that indicates the degree to which the alternative crop and the conventional
crop are more profit effective than the conventional and the GM crop, respectively. One
interpretation of P 4t + β1A is that P
4
t represents the per unit price of the conventional crop
received by all farmers growing the traditional crop, while α1A represents additional benefits
derived by individual A from the production of the conventional crop. These differences in
the return stem from such things as geography, education and management skills. A similar
interpretation holds for P 4gm + α1A.
Furthermore as previously mentioned farmers can smuggle illegal seeds from a black market.
In that case the per unit return of a producer with differentiating attribute A is given by:
• pi4s1 = P 4gm + (α1 − τs1δ1)A If one unit of smuggled crop is produced
The parameter τs1 stands for the penalty imposed on a farmer, caught using smuggling
seeds and δ1A for the audit probability. Following Giannakas (2002) and Chattopadhyay and
Horbulyk (2004), the audit probability depends on farm specific characteristics. Hence, less
efficient producers (i.e. farmers with low value of A) are more likely to smuggle and thereby
to infringe IPRs. As argued by Giannakas (2002) these producers are often located in more
secluded area where their land is fragmented in several plot making the audit of the farm more
difficult. Furthermore successful producers (i.e. with large value of A) are more exposed to
”whistle blowing” by jealous neighbors.5
To allow for positive supply of traditional and GM crops it is assumed that:(
P 4t − wlt1
)
(γ1 + φ1) /γ1 > P
4
gm −wgm1. Given that farmers are uniformly distributed and
assumed to supply a single unit of output, the farmer indifferent between growing a GM crop
5Following Giannakas (2002) and Chattopadhyay and Horbulyk (2004) the smuggling seeds have been as-
sumed to have the same profitability factor. While Morse, Bennet and Ismael (2005) report evidence that
farmers using smuggling seeds have lower agronomic performances. They are not certain that this was either
due to the specificity of the smuggled seeds or the specificity of the agricultural exploitations. Since they ob-
serve that smaller agricultural exploitations are the major user of smuggled GM seeds. A similar observation is
reported by Schnepf, Dohlman and Bolling (2001).
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and a conventional GM crop determines the quantity of GM products. Graphically this farmer
corresponds to the intersection of the net return functions associated with the production of GM
and conventional crops (i.e. the farmer with differentiating attribute A4gm1). Mathematically,
the total quantity of GM products supplied is given by:
S4gm1 = A
4
gm1 − 0 =
(
P 4gm − wgm1
)
−
(
P 4t − wlt1
)
φ1
(2.1)
while by the same reasoning the total quantity of agricultural products supplied corresponds
to:
S4T1 =
P 4t − wlt1
γ1
(2.2)
which implies that the quantity of conventional products supplied is:
S4t1 =
P 4t − wlt1
γ1
−
(
P 4gm − wgm1
)
−
(
P 4t − wlt1
)
φ1
(2.3)
Note that among the quantity of GM products supplied there is a quantity S4s1 = wgm1/δ1τs1
of products made from illegal smuggled seeds. Finally the total aggregate producer welfare
can be expressed as:
Π41 =
[
γ1 +
β1
2
] (
S4T1
)2
+ δ1τs1
(
S4s1
)2
2
+ φ1
(
S4gm1
)2
2
+ Ξ4 (2.4)
Where Ξ4 corresponds to the surplus derived from the production of the alternative crops
under Policy 4.
2.4.1.2 Production Decisions by the Rest of the World
Recall that the Policy regime is fixed in the ROW: approval without any labeling requirements
of the products of the biotechnology (Policy 3). Hence producers in the ROW have the choice
between planting a non-labeled GM or conventional crop or an alternative crop. The per
unit net returns associated with each crop by a farmer with differentiating attribute A can be
expressed as:
11
• pi4gm2 = P 4nl − wgm2 + α2A If one unit of GM crop is produced
• pi4t2 = P 4nl − wt2 + β2A If one unit of conventional crop is produced
• pia2 = χ2A If one unit of alternative crop is produced
In contrast with a labeling regime no price premium is offered to the production of con-
ventional crops. Farmers receive a per unit price, P 4nl, for the non-labeled crop irrespective
of their production choice. Notice that wt denotes the per unit base costs inherent to the
production of the conventional crop under a no labeling regime. Because of the segregation
costs incurred under a labeling regime, it is assumed that wt < w
l
t. The relevant quantities are
derived following the reasoning already applied to Country 1.6 The quantity of GM crops is
given by:
Sgm2 =
wt2 − wgm2
φ2
(2.5)
The total quantity supplied corresponds to:
S4nl2 =
P 4nl − wt2
γ2
(2.6)
While the total quantity of conventional crops is given by:
S4t2 =
P 4nl − wt2
γ2
− wt2 − wgm2
φ2
(2.7)
2.4.2 Demand Side
The methodological framework utilized in the analysis of consumption decisions derives from
the models of vertical product differentiation developed by Giannakas and Fulton (2002), Ful-
ton and Giannakas (2004) and Veyssiere and Giannakas (2006). This framework allows for
heterogeneous consumers preferences for GM and conventional products.
Let c ∈ [0, C] be the differentiating attribute that differentiates consumers. For simplicity
consumers are assumed uniformly distributed between the polar values of c. Consider a con-
sumer with differentiating attribute c. Under Policy 4, he has the choice of purchasing either a
6Again to allow for positive supply of both GM crops and its conventional counterpart it has been assumed
that:
(
P 4nl − wnlt2
)
(γ2 + φ2) /γ2 > P
4
nl − wgm2.
12
labeled GM or conventional product or a non-labeled product or a substitute. Assuming that
he only purchases one unit, his utility can be expressed as:
• U4t = U − µc − P 4t If one unit of the conventional product is
purchased
• E [U4nl] = U − [µ+ ψ4gm (λ− µ)] c − P 4nl If one unit of the non-labeled product is pur-
chased
• U4gm = U−λc−P 4gm If one unit of the GM-labeled product is purchased
• Us = U − Ps If one unit of the substitute is purchased
Where U stands for a per unit base level of utility common to all consumers associated
with consumption. Ps stands for the per unit retail price of the substitute product. µ and λ
stand for positive utility discount factors associated with the consumption of conventional and
GM products, respectively. To capture the expressed consumer’s opposition to GM products,
it is assumed that λ > µ with the difference λ − µ reflecting the level of consumer’s aversion
to the GM product. ψ4gm stands for the production share of GM products within the supply
of non-labeled products, ψ4gm = Sgm2/S
4
nl.
Because of the credence attribute of the GM product, consumers are uncertain about
the nature of the non-labeled product. Assuming that consumers have rational expectations,
the utility derived from the consumption of the non-labeled product is proportional to the
production share of GM products into the supply of non-labeled product ( ψ4gm). As a result,
the demand is not independent of the supply (on this issue see also Giannakas and Fulton
(2002), Fulton and Giannakas (2004) and Veyssiere and Giannakas (2006)).
The consumer with differentiating attribute c4gm is indifferent between purchasing the
labeled-conventional product and the non-labeled product. Therefore consumers located to
the left of c4gm prefer purchasing the GM product, while consumers located to the right buy
either the non-labeled product or labeled-conventional product or the substitute. Because con-
sumers are uniformly distributed between [0, C], c4gm gives the demand for the GM product.
Mathematically:
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D4gm =
P 4nl − P 4gm
(λ− µ)
(
1− ψ4gm
) (2.8)
The total quantity demanded corresponds to:
D4T =
Ps − P 4t
µ
(2.9)
The total quantity of the non-labeled product demanded is given by:
D4nl =
P 4t − P 4nl
ψ4gm (λ− µ)
− P
4
nl − P 4gm(
1− ψ4gm
)
(λ− µ)
(2.10)
Finally the quantity of the conventional product demanded is given by:
D4t =
Ps − P 4t
µ
− P
4
t − P 4nl
ψ4gm (λ− µ)
+
P 4nl − P 4gm(
1− ψ4gm
)
(λ− µ)
(2.11)
2.4.3 Market Outcomes: Aggregate Producer Welfare
Utilizing the supply and demand expressions previously established, the market equilibrium
conditions determine the prices and quantities of the relevant products, as well as, the level
of aggregate producer welfare. Under Policy 4 there are three markets: one for GM-labeled
products, one for non-labeled products and one for conventional-labeled products. The market
clearing conditions in each market imply that:
D4t = S
4
t = X
4
t (2.12)
D4nl = S
4
nl = X
4
nl (2.13)
D4gm = S
4
gm = X
4
gm (2.14)
Where X4t , X
4
nl and X
4
gm are the equilibrium quantities of conventional, non-labeled and
GM products traded in the world market, respectively. Note that under this market scenario
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Policies Level of Aggregate Producer Welfare
Policy 1 Π1∗1 =
[
γ1 +
β1
2
] (
X1nl1
)2
+ (φ1 + δ1τs1)
(S1s1)
2
2 + Ξ
1
Policy 2 Π2∗1 =
[
γ1 +
β1
2
] (
X2t
)2
+ Ξ2
Policy 3
Π3∗1 =
[
γ1 +
β1
2
] (
X3nl1
)2
+ δ1τs1
(S3s1)
2
2
+φ1
(Sgm1)
2
2 + Ξ
3
Policy 4
Π4∗1 =
[
γ1 +
β1
2
] (
X4T1
)2
+ δ1τs1
(S4s1)
2
2
+φ1
(X4gm1)
2
2 + Ξ
4
Table 2.1 Country 1 Payoff Matrix.
Country 1 is the unique supplier of both labeled conventional and GM products, hence X4t
and X4gm also corresponds to the equilibrium quantity of labeled conventional and GM traded
by country 1. Similarly X4nl denotes the equilibrium quantity of products supplied by ROW.
Substituting back the relevant expressions for the quantities demanded (i.e. equations (2.8),
(2.10) and (2.11)) and the quantities supplied (i.e. equations (2.1), (2.3) and (2.6)). Equa-
tions (2.12)-(2.14) form a system of three equations with the market equilibrium prices for
conventional, non-labeled and GM products as unknown. The solution of this system of equa-
tion provides the equilibrium market prices and quantities. Finally, substituting the above
equations into (2.4) the level of aggregate producer welfare in Country 1 is given by:
Π4∗1 =
[
γ1 +
β1
2
] (
X4T1
)2
+ δ1τs1
(
S4s1
)2
2
+ φ1
(
X4gm1
)2
2
+ Ξ4 (2.15)
By repeating the above analysis for the three remaining Policies the Payoff matrix of Country 1
(Table 2.1) can be established. As previously mentioned Country 1 will choose its agricultural
Policy by comparing the level of aggregate producer welfare under each Policy7.
7To simplify our analysis, given that the Innovator depicts foreign companies, Country 1 has not been
constrained to provide a minimum rent to the Innovator under approval of the GM technology. In practice this
needs not to be the case (for details see Giannakas, 2002 and Evenson, 2004). This simplifying assumption,
however, does not affect the qualitative nature of our result.
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2.5 Approval Decision
In this section two propositions regarding Country 1 approval decision are provided by the
analysis of the payoff matrix.
2.5.1 Approval Decision under a No Labeling Regime
Proposition 1: In the absence of any labeling requirement and under the coexistence of the
market for GM and conventional products, while with perfect enforcement of IPRs the welfare
effects from approval of the GM technology are ambiguous, with imperfect enforcement of IPRs,
non approval of the GM technology is the best response of an exporting Country wishing to
maximize its aggregate producer welfare.
This proposition is the result of the comparison of Policy 1 and 3 (i.e. Π1∗1 and Π3∗1 ). The
reasoning behind proposition 1 is as follow. With perfect enforcement of IPRs (i.e. complete
deterrence of smuggling frauds), approval of the products of the biotechnology has ambiguous
welfare effects on producers. There is a tradeoff between the producer’s benefits from the use
of the producer oriented first generation of GM products and the aggregate welfare loss due
to lower market price for the non-labeled product caused by a positive consumer aversion.
With approval of the GM technology some farmers turn to the production of official GM
crops because it is more profitable. As a result the production of GM products in Country
1 increases, which in turn raises the total production share of GM products. This change in
the nature of the world supply for non-labeled products will negatively affect consumer belief.
Now when purchasing a non-labeled product, consumers believe the likelihood of consuming a
GM product is higher. As a result the demand along with the price for non-labeled products
will decrease. Such price reduction diminishes aggregate producer welfare in Country 1.
The outcome of this tradeoff is an empirical question and will be determined by: (i) the
potential agronomic benefits of the GM technology (i.e. the size of α1), (ii) the level of market
power of the life science sector (i.e. wgm1) and (iii) the strength of consumer aversion (i.e. λ−µ)
but also by the shape of the distribution of farmers characteristics. In particular a distribution
of producers more skewed to the left will put more weight on the benefit from the approval of
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the GM technology. This result is in accordance with the quantitative analysis of the soybean
complex by Moschini and Lapan (2005). In considering a ban of the GM technology by Brazil
they report a rise in producer welfare because the price received by Brazilian farmers increased
due to consumer aversion.
On the other hand with imperfect enforcement of IPRs (i.e. incomplete deterrence of
smuggling frauds) the benefits from approving the products of the biotechnology are limited
since producers have already access to the smuggled seeds. In that case of figure the negative
welfare effects of the price reduction associated with approval of the GM products are greater
than the productivity gain. It is important to understand that this proposition states that
under imperfect enforcement of IPRs unofficial approval of the GM technology (since smuggling
frauds occur) should be preferred to official approval of the products of the biotechnology in
absence of a labeling regime. This means that imperfect enforcement of IPRs can prevent
countries to approve the products of the biotechnology.
2.5.2 Approval Decision under a Labeling Regime
Proposition 2: Under coexistence of the market for GM and conventional products, in
the presence of a mandatory labeling regime for agricultural products, approval of the GM
technology is the best response of a large exporting Country wishing to maximize its aggregate
producer welfare.
This proposition is the result of the comparison of Policy 2 and 4 (i.e. Π2∗1 and Π4∗1 ). The
reasoning behind this proposition is as follow. With approval of the GM technology, some
farmers in Country 1 turn to the production of GM crops because more profitable. As a result
the supply to the world market of labeled-conventional products by Country 1 diminishes,
while the supply of GM products increases. On the world market, with a labeling regime
consumer beliefs about the nature of the product are unaffected by supply changes. Therefore
the shifts in Country 1 supplies lead to a reduction in the price of labeled-GM products, while
the price premium for labeled-conventional products increases. Thus under Policy 4 the price
premium for conventional products will be higher than under Policy 1 because of the presence
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of the market for GM products. Therefore with a labeling regime the approval of the GM
technology is welfare enhancing for all producers in Country 1 and should be Country 1 best
response.
This proposition is empirically relevant and can explain both the absence of national reg-
ulation imposing a ban or moratorium of the GM products with a labeling regime (i.e. a
regulation similar to Policy 2) as well as the recent wave of approval of the GM technology
under a labeling regime by the European Union (in April 2004), Brazil (in March 2004) and
New Zealand and Australia (in December 2001) to cite a few.
However, it is important to note that proposition 2 assumes that the costs of segregation
are similar whether the GM technology has been approved or not. This is a very strong
assumption. As noted by Desquilbet and Bullock (2003) the costs of segregation associated
with a labeling regime are function of the relative size of the marketing channel for conventional
and GM products. Therefore these costs can be expected to be higher in the case of approval
of the product of the biotechnology (Policy 4) and thereby to reduce the welfare gain from
approval.
2.5.3 Environment Favorable to Approval
According to propositions 1 and 2 approval of the GM technology appears specific of the
labeling regime. The environment favorable to alternative labeling regime have already been
established and analyzed by Veyssiere and Giannakas (2006). While our model is different from
Veyssiere and Giannakas (2006) these discrepancies do not affect the qualitative nature of their
results. As in Veyssiere and Giannakas (2006) the main driver of our results is the effect of the
production share of GM products in the supply of non-labeled products on consumer beliefs,
under a no labeling regime. Because of this externality as the production share of GM products
increases on the world market (either because of high profitability of the GM technology in
Country 1 and/or the ROW and/or weak IPRs protection in Country 1 and/or the ROW
and/or low degree of market power by the life science sector in Country 1 and/or the ROW)
the demand and the price for non-labeled products will fall under a no labeling regime. This
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Policy 1: Non Approval & No Labeling
High segregation costs
Low consumer aversion
Low profitability of the GM technology
Strong IPRs
High degree of Market Power by the Innovator
Policy 4: Approval & Labeling
Low segregation costs
High consumer aversion
High profitability of the GM technology
Weak IPRs
Low degree of Market Power by the Innovator
Table 2.2 Environment favorable to each Policy.
was true in Veyssiere and Giannakas (2006) and is also verified here. According to equations
(2.31) and (2.32), as the quantity of GM products and/or smuggling increases in Country 1
and/or ROW the market price for non-labeled products decreases proportionally in consumer
aversion to the consumption of GM products. The reduction in the price of the non-labeled
products negatively affect all producers thereby reducing aggregate producer welfare under a
no labeling regime. Conversely under a labeling regime, producers will benefit from a more
profitable GM technology, a weak enforcement of IPRs and a low degree of market power by
the life science sector without suffering any demand loss for their products.
However, Veyssiere and Giannakas (2006) focused on GM producing countries (i.e. a com-
parison of Policy 3 and 4). Propositions 1 and 2 allow us to extend their results to GM free
countries and to characterize the environment favorable to the approval of the products of the
biotechnology. This environment is summarized in Table 2.2. This environment is summarized
in Table 2.2.
It is important to understand that the conditions presented in Table 2.2 represent depictions
of the general environment for approval or not of the products of the biotechnology to be favored
by Country 1. Since it is the interaction of all these factors that determines whether approval
or not can be Country 1 optimal policy, the conditions presented in Table 2.2 should be viewed
as sufficient, and not as necessary, conditions for the different policy to be preferred by Country
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1.
Furthermore it is interesting to note that while our analysis assumes that the Country’
objective is to maximize domestic producer welfare, the results summarized in Table 2.2 are
more general and apply to cases where Country 1 seeks either to maximize its market share
on the world market or to maximize aggregate consumer welfare. As shown by Giannakas and
Fulton (2002), consumers as a group are better off under a labeling (no labeling) regime when
their aversion to GM products is high (low), segregation costs are low (high), and the adoption
of the GM technology is high (low). The adoption of the GM technology is high under high
profitability of the GM technology (i.e. high α), low market power of the innovating firms
(i.e. low wgm), and weak IPRs (i.e. low δ and wgm). With non approval the adoption of the
GM technology is obviously minimized. Therefore the conditions reported in Table 2.2 that
make approval (no approval) the optimal policy for Country 1 are exactly those that result in
approval (no approval) being the policy that maximizes aggregate consumer welfare.
Before concluding this section it is interesting to note that a Country that maximizes the
Innovator profit is more likely to choose approval of the product of the biotechnology without
imposing labeling requirements (i.e. Policy 3 for detail see propositions 9 of Giannakas (2002)).
Such Policy preference is in sharp contrast with our result but not surprising. As noted by
Fulton and Giannakas (2004) it is very unlikely that these three groups (consumers, producers
and the Innovator) agree on their preferences for the different Policy.
2.5.4 Endogenous IPRs enforcement: Discussion
While our analysis assume that the level of IPRs is given to the country when making its
policy choice, in reality Countries also have to determine their level of IPRs enforcement along
with approval or not of the products of the biotechnology. According to Table 2.2, Country 1
should be willing to enforce its level of IPRs under a no labeling regime (i.e. Policy 1). Under
a no labeling regime, lax enforcement of IPRs increases the productions share of GM products
(by increasing the quantity of smuggled seeds, i.e. S1s1) into the world supply of non-labeled
products. As previously explained, this change in the nature of the world supply will negatively
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affect consumer beliefs. As a result, the demand along with the price for non-labeled product
will decrease, which in turn reduces aggregate producer welfare in Country 1. Therefore a
country unable to enforce its IPRs regime is more likely to be better off by approving and
labeling the products of the biotechnology. However, as noted by an anonymous reviewer it is
reasonable to doubt a country’s capacity to enforce a label GM free when it cannot prevent
the infringement of IPRs. Under a labeling regime identity preservation (IP) systems are
necessary to preserve the integrity of the label GM free. As for the protection of the innovator
rent, to implement a labeling regime monitoring of the marketing channels from the authority is
necessary. In the absence of monitoring because of the credence attribute of the GM products,
with a price premium for conventional products, it is by no mean insured that producers will
correctly label their products as GM (Gray, Moss and Schmitz, 2004)8. Hence, the deterrence
of mislabeling frauds and infringement of IPRs are linked and pending on the technical and
financial capacity of a country. As a result, a developing country unable to prevent smuggling
frauds might not have the capacity to guarantee the integrity of the conventional product, and
thus to credibly enforce a label GM free.9
Therefore the incapacity of enforcing IPRs may not only prevent a country from approving
the GM technology without any labeling requirement as previously mentioned in Proposition
1, but also may limit its capacity to credibly enforce a label GM free. As a consequence, it
may also prevent the country to approve the GM technology under a labeling regime.
Before concluding this section note that under non approval of the GM technology, en-
forcement of IPRs does not only take the form of farm audit but it also includes a stronger
monitoring of commodity flows across the border. In this context puzzling regulatory measures
such as the refusal of food aid (unless milled) containing GM ingredients by some African coun-
tries (such as Angola, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) can be viewed as regulatory measures
motivated by the threat of infringement of IPRs (The Economist, 2003 (b)).
8For instance Schnepf, Dohlman and Bolling (2001) reported that 40 % of soybean production was of GM
origin, while at that time the use of GM seeds was not authorized in Brazil. This has led the Economist (2003,
(a)) to wonder about the credibility and feasibility of a Brazilian label GM free.
9See Veyssiere (2006) for a numerical application illustrating this argument and how to account for mislabeling
frauds in the present framework.
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2.6 Conclusion
This article develops a stylized three-region model of heterogeneous producers and con-
sumers to analyze the best response of a large Country that has to determine the optimal
standard for GM products along with the optimal level of IPRs enforcement. Specifically, our
analysis utilizes the methodological framework developed in Veyssiere and Giannakas (2006)
that analyzes the effect of the strategic interdependence in the labeling decision by GM produc-
ing countries. Unlike Veyssiere and Giannakas (2006), however, our study explicitly accounts
for a GM free Country having to decide in addition to its labeling Policy whether to approve
or not the marketing of GM products. To our knowledge, the approval of the products of the
biotechnology by a large GM free country strategically interacting with the Rest of the World
has not been considered previously.
The approval decision is modeled in this article as a sequential strategic game played by a
large GM free Country having to determine the optimal standard for its agricultural products
(adopt or not and/or label or not GM products). In doing so, the article establishes that the
approval decision is dependent on the labeling regime. In particular, under conditions favorable
to a mandatory labeling regime, approval of the GM technology should be the Country’s best
response. On the other hand, in the absence of labeling requirements, to not authorize the
marketing of GM crops should be the Country’s best response.
Moreover, while the recent literature on the economy of IPRs of the products of the biotech-
nology has focused on a small economy (Giannakas, 2002 and Chattopadhyay and Horbulyk,
2004), this article explicitly considers IPRs infringement in a large economy.
Our results show that in contrast to a small economy, a large economy should benefit from
a strong level of IPRs enforcement. However, developing Countries might not have at their
disposal the financial and technical capacity necessary to enforce IPRs. As a result the financial
burden associated with IPRs and label protection can constitute an impediment to the official
adoption of the GM technology. Furthermore their incapacity to deter smuggling can entail
severe welfare losses.
In addition to providing insights to Policy makers in their regulatory decision towards GM
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products, these results rationalize the recent approval by Brazil and the European Union of
GM products under a mandatory labeling regime (The Economist, 2003 (a)) as well as the
surprising refusal of food aid containing GM products by Ethiopia (The Economist, 2003 (b)).
Interesting extension of this research could include the consideration of private actors such as
the processing and retailing industry in the approval and enforcement of IPRs.
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CHAPTER 3. A FINANCIAL CONTRACTING APPROACH TO THE
ROLE OF SUPERMARETS IN FARMER’S CREDIT ACCESS
Modified from a paper to be published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics
Philippe Marcoul1 and Luc Veyssiere
3.1 Abstract
In developing countries, moneylenders who lend to farmers monitor them to make sure
that their investment is not diverted. Similarly, modern production contracts offered by su-
permarkets or agro-export firms entail a loan component under the form of input advances
and, like traditional moneylenders, supermarkets also want to make sure that this investment
is not diverted. However, unlike moneylenders, supermarkets do care about the attributes
of the product (form, quality, food safety, etc.). Whether such attributes are present in the
harvested product is largely influenced by the advice and the extension services received by
the farmer. We built a financial contracting model where we show that supermarkets, choosing
to forgo specialization, optimally delegate to a multi-tasking agent both the monitoring and
the advisory missions. This contract is shown to potentially enhance credit access for small
farmers and sometimes to involve excessive monitoring. Finally, when involved in production,
small farmers are shown to benefit the most, even though the supermarket has all bargaining
power when making the contract offer.
1Corresponding authorl
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3.2 Introduction
In the last two decades, we have witnessed an impressive development of supermarket chains
in developing countries. Saturation and intense competition in retail markets of developed
countries, together with substantial margins offered by investing in developing markets, have
largely contributed to the emergence of supermarket chains.2 In countries where a substantial
portion of the population lives in rural areas, the rise of supermarkets, that arguably affect the
livelihood of farmers, is a sensitive issue. Although they represent a source of investment in
local economies, their real welfare impacts are hard to assess and remain controversial. On the
one hand, many empirical studies have found that supermarkets tend to leave behind or ex-
ploit small growers, preferring to concentrate their procurement of fresh agricultural products
in larger scale operations (Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Dolan, Humphrey and Harris-Pascal
2001 and Trail 2006).3 On the other hand, although many growers successfully work with su-
permarkets, it is not clear whether growers who fail to enter a business relationship with them
are worse off relative to the period preceding their entry. In addition, other recent case studies
have somewhat challenged the view that supermarkets have only a negative impact on small
growers. In particular, these studies show that in niche markets small growers perform re-
markably well and remain an attractive supply source for supermarket chains (Boselie, Henson
and Weatherspoon 2003; Henson, Masakure and Boselie 2005 and Minten, Randrianarison and
Swinnen forthcoming). However, while arguments on both sides are compelling, it is somewhat
difficult, in light of these (rather) contradictory observations, to forge a clear understanding
of the impact of supermarkets on grower activity. The objective of this paper is to contribute
to this debate by providing a theoretical framework to analyze the impact that supermarkets
have on growers’ credit access.
There exists an important descriptive literature on supermarkets in developing countries.
2For instance, Carrefour, a French-based supermarket chain, earned on average three times higher margins
in its Argentine operations than in those located in France (Reardon et al., 2003).
3While the local demand for food is globally increasing, supermarket chains established in developing coun-
tries also export a substantial portion of their production to developed countries (Dolan and Humphrey 2000).
Thus, supermarket production will only exclude a portion of the growers that remains uninvolved with the
supermarket.
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This literature describes and discusses what these retail chains are trying to accomplish and
how they achieve their goals. First, it must be noted that besides the growing (local) demand
for fresh food products that they try to meet, supermarkets or their affiliated grocers demand
a substantially higher quality in the products they procure. Thus, supermarkets not only need
to sell more in local markets, but they need to offer safer and higher quality products, as well.
Therefore, the natural response of supermarkets has been to develop their own standards in
countries where public food quality standards are often inadequate and lack proper enforce-
ment.4 However, the quest for higher quality and safer food products cannot be achieved
without innovative procurement practices. These practices revolve around the creation of ver-
tical relationships with growers through the establishment of tighter procurement contracts.
Although the specific form of the contractual relationship between the grower and the super-
market can vary greatly depending on the context, there is arguably a common denominator.
Typically, supermarkets require their growers to make a substantial up-front investment in
their operations. This investment ranges from new equipment purchases to the establishment
of quality control and coordination systems. The literature analyzing supermarket procure-
ment practices also reports that supermarkets are playing new roles in the production process.
These roles essentially consist of a combination of intense production monitoring and advising,
sometimes using the support of public partners (Boselie, Henson and Weatherspoon 2003). In
practice, the advising is performed on the spot, when supermarket employees visit producers
and discuss with them problems encountered during the growing cycle. The typical advice
ranges from the proper way to apply fertilizers to the safe handling of pesticides. In addi-
tion, supermarkets also take on a monitoring role that essentially protects their investment in
the growers’ operations. Indeed, the relationship between farmers and supermarkets features
a strong moral hazard component. For instance, to certify that product standards are met,
but also that procured quantities are sufficient, supermarkets must make sure growers follow
specific procedures and do not cheat or misrepresent their efforts and/or actions.5
4As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, even with stringent domestic requirements in terms of food
standards, supermarkets may still develop their own private standards for two reasons. First via product
differentiation, the supermarket can lessen price competition. Second, by imposing high standards requirements,
supermarkets may prevent the entry of new competitors.
5The most common form of cheating faced by supermarkets is one in which farmers sell part of their crop
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Finally, although supermarkets rarely provide cash credit to farmers, they extend loans in
the form of input advances that are reimbursed later when the crop is sold.6 These input loans,
which range from seeds to fertilizers and pesticides, cover most of the necessary inputs and their
amount can be substantial relative to expected crop payments.7 Supermarkets also attempt
to absorb some of the growers’ risks related to market conditions. This is usually achieved
by committing to input and output prices prior to planting. Such commitments arguably
result in lower liquidity needs for growers and are, in that sense, equivalent to additional loans.
Overall, supermarkets’ objectives seem to ensure that the financial and production risks faced
by their grower base are sustainable and compatible with a long-term dedication to safe and
high-quality products (Henson, Masakure and Boselie 2005).
The organization of production by supermarkets, nevertheless, raises several questions. For
instance, it is not clear from a theoretical standpoint why supermarkets should provide such a
bundle of services. It is conceivable that advising services could be provided independently of
input loans. Farmers could finance, possibly using moneylending services, the purchase of the
inputs necessary to carry out the production process.8 Supermarkets would then purchase the
crop, provided that it met a certain quality threshold. The mere fact that such organization
of production does not prevail in practice suggests that substantial benefits exist in bundling
these tasks. In particular, to the extent that supermarkets are keen to have a large grower
base for, say, smooth risks, it is possible that this organization of production will allow more
farmers to access credit. More generally, we wonder how the emergence of supermarkets will
modify credit access for small growers.
Our definition of the supermarket procurement process is very similar to that of contract
farming. Production financing in contract farming usually involves technical advising and mon-
(for a higher price) to other grocers or local markets and, therefore, do not deliver the quantity that was agreed
upon (Gow and Swinnen 2001 and Minten, Randrianarison and Swinnen forthcoming).
6Cash advances are, in fact, widespread in transition countries (Gow and Swinnen 2001).
7For instance, Boselie, Henson and Weatherspoon (2003) report that it takes a number of plantings for
producers to achieve a net overall profit.
8In developing countries, credit loans extended by traditional moneylenders use growers’ crops as collateral.
To make sure that the grower repays his loan, the moneylenders closely monitor him during the crop cycle to
make sure that he does not secretly side-sell and then default on their loan by pretending to have a bad harvest
(See Aleem 1990 and Hoff and Stiglitz 1998). Unlike advising, the monitoring exerted by the supermarket is
very similar to that of traditional moneylending (See Conning 2000 and Minten, Randrianarison and Swinnen
forthcoming, for the case of supermarket monitoring.)
29
itoring. As described by Conning (2000), contract farming, apart from the advising part, is
not different from traditional moneylending. In particular, it possesses all the informal aspects
of moneylending. This type of lending has become prevalent in many developing countries.
For instance, Conning (2000) reports that during the last 20 years production finance has
become dominant in Chile. While we rely essentially on the survey of Lecofruit in Madagas-
car by Minten, Randrianarison and Swinnen (forthcoming), the mechanisms for control and
compliance, which either involve contract farming or out-grower schemes, all entail some input
lending to farmers. Moreover, in all cases the standard to be achieved by farmers in terms
of production are quiet stringent. For instance the EUREP-GAP certification corresponds to
the standard followed by European supermarkets.9 Arguably, this is one of the most stringent
standards in terms of quality and safety of food products. Note that in most of the cases, com-
pany extension services are in charge of following and guiding farmers during the production
cycle. In other cases (Alice and TOPS), advising services are provided by public organizations
either for free or for reduced fees.
In this paper, we analyze the market for loans to growers by using a simple model of financial
contracting. In our framework, growers need to make a financial investment before they can
produce for the supermarket. In addition, during the production process, proper monitoring
and advising of growers enhances the likelihood of crop success. We show that an organization
in which the supermarket extends a loan and delegates advising and monitoring to the same
agent is preferred by the supermarket, and also by growers. More precisely, bundling these
tasks in the financial contract results in an organization in which motivation costs or agency
rents are reduced. This rent contraction results in more poor growers obtaining loans. Our
multitasking approach provides a new perspective to apprehend this type of contract and can
explain its relative superiority with respect to bank financing or traditional moneylending.
Furthermore, we show that supermarkets have a preference for wealthy farmers. However,
this preference is not strictly monotonic and is subordinated to the assumption that the su-
permarket can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the farmer. When hired, small farmers are
9It should be noted that some local supermarkets do not always use contract farming, but merely buy
standard product at the procurement center back door.
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shown to derive strictly positive rents from their relationship with supermarkets. Finally, from
a social standpoint, contracts offered by supermarkets might be suboptimal in the sense that
they entail excessive monitoring.
In what follows, we briefly present the existing literature on lending in developing countries
that is relevant to our work. We also relate our paper to the corporate finance literature on
advising and venture capital. The model developed in the main section formalizes the basic
idea of bundling advising and monitoring tasks in the same financial contract. We then study
growers’ incentives in this setup. Finally, we study how standards affect competition in the
final market, and thereby influence growers’ access to loans.
3.3 Relation to the literature
The literature on moneylending in developing countries starts with the premise that bor-
rowers in developing countries usually have weak balance sheets, and therefore have difficulty
accessing financing. Most of the contributions in this field describe mechanisms by which bor-
rowers are able to commit to repay their loans.10 In the spirit of this literature on financial
contracting in developing countries, our main result is to show that, by combining these two
tasks, the supermarket allows poorly collateralized growers to obtain a loan; a loan that they
would otherwise not obtain. This result is, to the best of our knowledge, novel. Indeed, a few
contributions have dealt with contract farming but these contributions remain descriptive in
nature (Key and Runsten (1999)). An exception is Swinnen and Vandeplas (2007) who model
contact farming as a two-sided moral hazard bilateral relationship. Like us, they show that
the farmer can derive a rent from this relationship. However, unlike us they do not discuss
credit access as a function of farmer’s wealth.
In developing countries, production contracts between exporters or supermarkets on one
side and farmers on the other side usually involve loans in the form of an input advance.
In this relationship, the supermarkets not only behave as external consultants that provide
production advice as to what should be done with the product, but also play the role of
10For a good review of the literature on financial contracting in developing countries, we refer the reader to
Armenda´riz de Aghion and Morduch (2005).
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conventional moneylenders.
As investigated by Aleem (1990) and Hoff and Stiglitz (1998), the informal lending activity
in developing countries is usually performed by local agents who can easily monitor borrowers.
Hoff and Stiglitz (1998), especially emphasize the fact that the moneylending activity is an
informationally intensive activity characterized by monopolistic competition. Similarly, our
work assumes that supermarkets employ well-informed local agents to perform the monitoring
activity.11 This monitoring activity of supermarket employees is very close in nature to that
of moneylenders.12
Our work also shares common features with the literature on venture capital. Casamatta
(2003) studies under which conditions an entrepreneur (in fact, a borrower) should hire an
advisor. Similar to the supermarket agent in our model, when the venture capitalist advises
diligently, the probability of a successful project increases. Casamatta (2003) provides a ra-
tionale for the existence of venture capitalists by showing that these advisors have to provide
funds, as well.
Although the investment scale of the project is quite different, most agro-industries like
supermarkets play a role that is, arguably, qualitatively identical to that played by venture
capitalists. Indeed, supermarket employees do not limit their activity to monitoring growers;
they continuously advise them on best production practices. Moreover, it is well documented
that supermarket agents have a specific and substantial knowledge of horticulture and, in that
sense, are valuable advisors.13
11For instance, Minten, Randrianarison and Swinnen (forthcoming) describe the organization of the procure-
ment activity by retail chains in Madagascar. They write (p. 11):
Every extension agent, the chef de culture, is responsible for about thirty farmers. To supervise
these, (s)he coordinates five or six extension assistants (assistant de culture) that live in the village
itself. The chef de culture has a permanent salary paid by the firm.
12Minten, Randrianarison and Swinnen (forthcoming) also describe the frequency and purpose of the moni-
toring (p. 12):
During the cultivation period of the vegetables under contract, the contractor is visited on average
more than once (1.3 times) a week. This intensive monitoring is to ensure correct production
management as well as to avoid ‘side-selling’
13Again, Minten, Randrianarison and Swinnen (forthcoming) write:
The second constraint is human capital and long duration required for training of the assistants
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From a purely theoretical standpoint, our contribution also relates to recent work on the
design of contracts involving multitasking agents. Laux (2001) shows how, in a limited-liability
contracting environment, wage cost can be reduced by assigning several independent projects
to a single agent rather than to several agents. By paying the agent only when all projects
succeed, the principal can relax the agent’s limited liability constraint by punishing the agent
for a given project by taking away payment on another.
More recently, Hueth and Marcoul (2007) model producer cooperatives by assuming that
members provide not only work (as input providers), but also monitor managerial activity (as
directors). The resulting multitasking structure is shown to strictly lower motivation costs.
In the next section we develop a sequential model in which every organization choice affects
financial contracting outcomes. The financial contract model that we use is similar in spirit to
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).14 However, unlike the former, our model features an additional
advisory task as a key ingredient for project success.
3.4 Procurement organization: a model
Consider a rural economy made up of a population of farmers, an agrifood sector and a
financial sector. All the agents of this economy are assumed to be risk neutral. While the
agrifood sector involves a supermarket/exporter and a procurement agent, the financial sector
involves a bank and a moneylender.
Farmers. Farmers are assumed to be heterogenous in their level of financial capacity, A.
The presence of the supermarket provides farmers with the opportunity to develop a production
project whose success is stochastic. More precisely, if the project is undertaken, it yields a
verifiable income stream of R > 0 in case of success and 0 if it fails. ¿From the farmer’s
perspective, this project requires two inputs: his effort and a fixed-size investment I. When
the farmer works diligently, the probability of crop success is raised by pH . However, diligence
de culture which organize and supervise the contracting farmers in the field. It is estimated that
it takes on average two or three years until the firm will be able to give him/her full responsibility
in the field. This slows down growth and expansion.
14For applications of this framework to developing countries, see Conning (1999).
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by the farmer is subject to moral hazard, as he may decide to shirk to enjoy a private benefit
B.15 In this case the farmer does raise at all the likelihood of crop success.
To make the problem non trivial, we assume that I > A, so that, in order to operate
farmers need to borrow I −A > 0 from a financial investor.
The bank. The bank can provide I − A to farmers. The bank is a passive but rational
investor; it extends a loan as long as it can recoup it in expectation. It is passive in the sense
that it does not have the capacity to supervise borrowing farmers. As a result, banks rely
primarily on collateral-based enforcement of their loans. The bank, when accepting farmers’
loan applications, cannot observe whether farmers will exert effort or not. In line with Innes
(1990) and all of the literature on financial contracting, farmers are assumed to be protected
by limited liability; i.e. investors can at most seize the realized outcome. Thus, farmers need
to make a credible commitment to the bank on their supply of effort in order for their loan
applications to be accepted.
Financing can also be eased by using the services of a procurement agent and a moneylender.
The moneylender. The moneylender is a member of the rural community working for
the bank, whose function is to monitor farmers. He has an informational advantage and
the bank cannot ascertain whether the monitoring is carried out seriously or not. Therefore,
diligent monitoring must be induced through contingent payments. Effective monitoring by the
moneylender implies that he privately incurs a cost m > 0. Similar to Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997), the impact of monitoring is to reduce the farmers’ opportunity costs of misbehaving
by reducing the benefit of shirking to b, with B > b. To make the demand for the moneylender
service a viable option, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1
B − b ≥ m. (3.1)
This assumption simply states that the reduction in the private benefit of the farmer, B−b,
is greater than the private cost of monitoring, m. Under this assumption, it will be shown later
15Based on a survey of Ivory Coast agricultural producers, Biais, Azam, Dia and Maurel (2001) estimate that
this opportunity cost of effort is important. Specifically, they report a value for B as large as 40 percent of the
investment.
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that the compensation left to the moneylender to induce proper monitoring is less than the
reduction in the farmer’s private benefit. It is intuitive that under this assumption monitoring
improves the feasibility of the crop project.16
The procurement agent. The procurement agent is also a member of the rural commu-
nity possibly trained by the supermarket in delivering production advice. This advice helps to
bring the product in conformity with the supermarket’s specific standards. Effective advising
from the procurement agent will raise the probability of success of the project by pA. In other
words, when the advisor and the farmer are both diligent, the probability of crop success is
pA + pH . The advising activity is itself subject to moral hazard, as the procurement agent
may prefer shirking on his advising mission to avoid a private cost c. To guarantee a positive
demand for service from the procurement agent we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2
pAR ≥ (pA + pH) c
pA
. (3.2)
This assumption implies that the value of the project is increased by incurring the advising
motivation costs of the agent. Thus, whoever makes the production contract offer always find
it optimal to hire a procurement agent. The procurement agent could also be trained by the
supermarket in monitoring. Like the moneylender, he may decide to shirk to avoid incurring
a private cost m.
The supermarket. The agrifood company has to decide the scope of its activity. The
company can hire a procurement agent whose task is simply to advise the farmer. In that
case, the financing part is left to the conventional banking sector (here, the bank and the
moneylender). The company can also choose to “integrate these tasks under the same roof” by
hiring an agent who will both advise and monitor the farmer. In this organizational choice, the
monitoring role is assumed by the supermarket agent. As such, the supermarket will replace
the bank as a passive investor. For simplicity, the opportunity cost of funds is normalized to
1 for both the bank and the supermarket.
16Note that undertaking monitoring implies that the social value of the project is reduced by m. Therefore,
from a social standpoint it is a pure loss, and monitoring should be undertaken only if it improves project
feasibility.
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Finally, we make the following assumption on the parameters:
Assumption 3
max {pHR+ c, pAR− c+B} − I < 0, (3.3)
(pH + pA)R− c−m− I > 0. (3.4)
In words, the first condition states that operating the project with a low effort in at least
one moral hazard dimension is ruled out. This assumption implies that, in equilibrium, no loan
contract that gives one agent incentives to misbehave will be granted. The second condition
implies that projects involving monitoring generate a strictly positive surplus.
Summarizing a bit: in the crop production process, diligence in both advising and farming
generates a probability pH + pA of success, but when shirking on advising and diligence in
farming occurs (respectively, diligence in advising and shirking on farming occurs), the prob-
ability of success is then pH (resp. pA).
17 When shirking occurs on both tasks, crop failure is
certain. Lastly, the purpose of monitoring is to lower the farmer’s private benefit from B to b.
The interaction between the agents described above is modeled as a four stage sequential
game. The timing of events is as follows.
Organizational choice. In the first stage, the supermarket decides between two types of
production organization: one in which it hires an agent whose task is solely to advise the
farmer on the operation and another in which it hires an agent not only for the advising but
also for the monitoring tasks.
Contracting. The agent who holds the bargaining power, the farmer or the supermarket,
makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to all the parties involved in the production cycle. More
specifically, the offer is a loan agreement specifying a sharing rule according to which, in case
of success, the revenue R is divided among all participants. In case of failure, limited liability
17This additive specification implies that effort by the farmers and the advisor are not complementary. Instead,
each contributes separately to improve the project success likelihood. This assumption certainly simplifies our
computation. Introducing some complementarity between the advising and farming tasks would reinforce our
main results.
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implies that all participants receive 0.18 If the contract is accepted, the game proceeds to
investment; otherwise it ends at this point and all participants are free to consume their initial
endowment.19 Immediately after the contract is signed, the farmer invests A while the bank (or
the supermarket, pending on the chosen organization of production in the first stage) delivers
I −A.20
Effort choice. The advisor and the monitor (if one is involved) move first.21 They simulta-
neously decide to monitor (or not) and advise (or not) the farmer. The farmer then observes
the outcome of the game and, in turn, decides to be diligent or not during the growth cycle.
Production outcome. The production outcome is realized and the return of the project is
shared according to the agreement signed at the contracting stage.
The contract design problem consists in optimally sharing the project return, R, without
destroying incentives for diligent behavior by the farmer, the moneylender and the procurement
agent.
To understand the rationale behind the supermarket’s choice of the production organiza-
tion, the game is solved by backward induction. In the next sections, the optimal contract
is systematically established for each potential organization of production; i.e. an organiza-
tion where the bank finances farmers, the moneylender monitors and the procurement agent
advises and an organization where the supermarket finances farmers while the procurement
agent monitors and advises farmers. The comparison of the (privately) optimal contracts un-
der alternative organization of production will determine the organization preference of the
supermarket. We first begin with the case in which the farmer has all the bargaining power at
the contracting stage.
18The farmer’s net payoff in case of failure is thus −A, while it is − (I −A) for the investor.
19In the event of the contract being turned down, the farmer would consume A and his net payoff would be
0.
20We assume that once I is invested, it is sunk and it has no recovery value in case of failure. This may be the
case if the investment is highly specific to the agroindustrial firm or if we are dealing with input advances that
are consumed during the growth cycle. However, it is possible to assume that the investment has a salvage value
if the project fails. Making a “redeployability” assumption would ease credit access but would not qualitatively
modify our results.
21For the monitor, this might involve, for instance, observing the farmer’s habits or determining before they
occur when and where “pirate sales” are likely to happen.
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3.5 Monitoring and advising by separate agents: the farmer makes the
offer
We consider an organization of production where the supermarket hires the procurement
agent to advise, and where financing and monitoring are performed by the bank and the
moneylender, respectively. While, according to Assumption 2, farmers always have an interest
in requiring an advisor, it is by no means guaranteed that farmers will find it optimal to hire a
moneylender. However, for the sake of exposition, we focus on the most general case, where the
four parties are involved in production. The farmer has to share the project return with the
moneylender, the procurement agent and the bank when formulating the financial contract.
This optimal sharing rule can be established by solving the following program
max
Rf
{Uf = (pH + pA)Rf −A} (3.5)
R = Rf +Rm +Rp +Rb, (3.6)
(pH + pA)Rf ≥ pARf + b (3.7)
(pH + pA)Rp − c ≥ pHRp (3.8)
(pH + pA)Rm −m ≥ pARm (3.9)
(pH + pA)Rb ≥ I −A. (3.10)
Here, Uf denotes the farmer’s expected net return from the project, while Rf , Rp, Rm and
Rb denote the success-contingent stakes of the project obtained by the farmer, the moneylender,
the procurement agent and the bank, respectively.
The first constraint (3.6) states that the project return R is divided among the contracting
parties. The following expressions (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8) denote the incentive constraints of
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the farmer, the procurement agent and moneylender, respectively. As usual in agency models,
each constraint requires that the agent earns at least as much from being diligent (i.e. produce
effort for the farmer, advise for the procurement agent and monitor for the moneylender) than
from shirking. The left-hand sides of (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8) represent the expected net return
assuming diligence of the farmer, the procurement agent and the moneylender, respectively.
The right hand side of these expressions denotes their expected net returns when shirking.22
Finally, the last expression denotes the bank participation constraint. The banking sector
is assumed perfectly competitive, and in order to accept a loan application the bank should
at least break-even. The left-hand side of (3.10) refers to the expected benefits from lending,
while the right-hand side is the market value of the fund supplied by the local bank. Recall
that the opportunity cost of funds is normalized to 1.
The solution of the above program is given in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 [Monitoring and advising by separate agents]: When the organization chosen
by the supermarket is such that the bank finances farmers, the procurement agent advises
while the moneylender monitors, there exist two thresholds of financial capacity, given by
Aa = I − (pA + pH) (R− c/pA −B/pH) and Aam = I − (pA + pH) [R− c/pA − (b+m) /pH ]
such that the optimal contract has the following features:
• if A ≥ Aa, farmers borrow solely from the bank. Their expected net return is given by
Uaf = (pA + pH) [R− c/pA]− I,
• if Aa ≥ A ≥ Aam, farmers borrow from banks and hire a moneylender. Their expected
net return is given by Uamf = (pA + pH) [R− c/pA −m/pH ]− I,
• if A < Aam, farmers do not have access to credit.
This Proposition states that wealthy farmers have an advantage in obtaining loans, as they
can bypass the services of the moneylender. In essence, monitoring allows poorer farmer to
22Note that the sequential nature of the game is important in interpreting the constraints. For instance,
when the farmer deviates from “diligence” in expression (3.7), it is taken into account that the monitor and the
advisor have been induced to be diligent. Indeed, when the farmer shirks, his private benefit is b (monitoring is
effective) and the probability of success is pA (the farmer has been advised).
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obtain credit. Finally, very poor farmers simply cannot access credit, even though according
to Assumption 3, these projects are socially worthwhile. The existence of credit rationing in
our context is driven by informational frictions. Indeed, moral hazard, together with limited
liability, implies that agency rents have to be distributed to implement the project. This
creates a wedge between the social value of the project and the total motivation costs that
must be incurred to implement it.
The proof for this result conveys important intuitions useful to understanding the rest
of the paper. We therefore give it in the text. Consider first the contract when the farmer
decides to hire the supermarket’s procurement agent but not the moneylender. Since there is
no moneylender, we can set Rm equal to 0 and drop the constraint (3.9). Without monitoring,
the private benefit of the farmer when shirking is B. Thus, the farmer’s incentive constraint
(3.7) is rewritten as
Rf ≥ B
pH
. (3.11)
Likewise, the procurement agent’s incentive compatibility constraint (3.8) can be rewritten
as
Rp ≥ c
pA
. (3.12)
Substituting back (3.11) and (3.12) into the sharing rule (3.6), the maximum share that
can be pledged by the farmer to the bank while applying for a loan is given by
Rab = R−
B
pH
− c
pA
. (3.13)
Rab is referred to as the pledgeable income. The pledgeable income is the maximum amount
that can be credibly promised to investors, i.e. the bank, without destroying the incentives of
the agents involved in the financial contract (here, the farmer and the procurement agent).
If the farmer were to pledge more than Rab , then the incentive constraint of the farmer (3.11)
and/or the procurement agent (3.12) would not be satisfied. As a consequence, the project
prospect would be jeopardized and the bank would optimally reject the loan application. More
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importantly, the pledgeable income creates a lower bound on the level of financial capacity
that the farmer must hold to obtain credit. Indeed, substituting back (3.13) into (3.10) leads
to
A ≥ Aa = I − (pA + pH)
[
R− c
pA
− B
pH
]
. (3.14)
Thus, farmers with wealth A < Aa cannot convince a bank that they will reimburse the
loan entirely, for the latter knows that at least one incentive constraint will be violated.
Recalling that the farmer is residual claimant on the contract, constraints (3.8), (3.9) and
(3.10) must be binding, which implies that
Uaf = (pA + pH)
[
R− c
pA
]
− I. (3.15)
Not surprisingly, because the moneylending sector is competitive, the farmer captures the
surplus of the project less the share given to the procurement agent.
Finally, farmers with a level of finance lower than Aa can ask for the supervision of a
moneylender to obtain a loan from the bank. Under the supervision of a moneylender, his
private benefit from shirking equals b. Hence, assuming proper monitoring by the moneylender,
the incentive compatibility constraint of the farmer is rewritten as
Rf ≥ b
pH
. (3.16)
In a sense, by hiring a moneylender, the borrower commits to curtail his share in the project
to raise his pledgeable income. However, for the moneylender to effectively monitor, according
to (3.9) he should be provided a share of the project such that Rm ≥ mpH .
Following the same logic as before, the pledgeable income, when a moneylender is involved,
is
Ramb = R−
b
pH
− m
pH
− c
pA
. (3.17)
Given Assumption 1, Ramb > R
a
b and therefore by hiring a moneylender, the farmer raises
his pledgeable income. Substituting (4.17) into (4.10) leads to
41
A ≥ Aam = I − (pA + pH)
[
R− c
pA
− b+m
pH
]
. (3.18)
As expected, by raising the farmers pledgeable income, monitoring reduces the minimum
level of financing necessary to obtain a loan.
The expected net return of a farmer under the supervision of the moneylender are then
computed as
U
am
f = (pA + pH)
[
R− c
pA
− m
pH
]
− I. (3.19)
Given that a share of the project now has to be forfeited to the moneylender to guarantee
proper monitoring, we have U
am
f ≤ U
a
f . Therefore, when given the choice between hiring the
services of a moneylender or not (i.e. farmers with a level of finance A ≥ Aa), a farmer will
always prefer not to hire a moneylender.
Finally, note that the moneylender and the procurement agent will both enjoy a positive
expected net return of Γml = (pA + pH)Rm − m = mpA/pH and Φa = (pA + pH)Rp − c =
cpH/pA respectively. These positive expected net returns guarantee their participation in the
project. This concludes the proof of Proposition 1.
3.6 Monitoring and advising by the procurement agent
In this section, we now explore the possibility that the supermarket decides to play the role
of the financial sector. To do so, it provides loans to farmers, instructs the procurement agent
to monitor the reimbursement of these loans and also trains him to advise farmers on crop
matters. In practice, the loan often takes the form of an input advance on seeds, pesticides or
fertilizers.23
Unlike the previous case, the multitasking nature of the procurement agent now generates
several incentive constraints. First, the procurement agent must be given reward Rp, such that
23The fact that the supermarket offers inputs rather than cash has several rationales. First, there are economies
of scale in procurement; supermarkets or grocers often serve several thousand growers. Second, there is arguably
less scope for diversion of physical inputs, although it is still possible that farmers may try to resell them in a
secondary market.
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he does not want to work on the monitoring task alone. His incentive constraint is written as
(pA + pH)Rp −m− c ≥ pHRp −m,
Rp ≥ c
pA
. (3.20)
Conversely, he should not want to shirk on the monitoring task while working on the
advising. Using the same logic, we have
Rp ≥ m
pH
. (3.21)
Finally, the procurement agent can decide to shirk on both tasks, in which case the incentive
constraint is written as (pA + pH)Rp −m− c ≥ 0 or
Rp ≥ m+ c
pA + pH
. (3.22)
Overall, the procurement agent will be diligent in performing both tasks if constraints
(3.20), (3.21), and (3.22) hold true. Thus, the minimum stake consistent with procurement
agent diligence is
Rp ≥ max
{
c
pA
,
m
pH
,
m+ c
pA + pH
}
. (3.23)
Furthermore, with the procurement agent performing both monitoring and advising, pro-
duction will involve three agents: the procurement agent, the farmer and the supermarket.
In this organization of production, to obtain financing from the supermarket, the contract
proposed by the farmer should solve the following program
max
Rf
{Uf = (pH + pA)Rf −A} (3.24)
subject to
R = Rf +Rp +Rs, Rf ≥ b
pH
, Rp ≥ max
{
c
pA
,
m
pH
,
m+ c
pA + pH
}
, (pH + pA)Rs ≥ I −A. (3.25)
Here, Rs denotes the share of the project received by the supermarket. Solving the program
above gives the following result.
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Proposition 2 [Monitoring and advising by the same agent]: When the organization chosen
by the supermarket is such that the supermarket finances farmers and the procurement agent
advises and monitors, there exist two thresholds of financial capacity, Aa and A
S
am = I −
(pA + pH)
[
R− bpH −max
{
c
pA
, mpH ,
m+c
pA+pH
}]
, such that the optimal contract offered by the
farmer to the supermarket and the procurement agent has the following features:
• if A ≥ Aa, farmers borrow solely from the supermarket. Their expected net return is
given by Uaf .
• if Aa ≥ A ≥ ASam, farmers borrow from the supermarket, which hires a multitask pro-
curement agent.
Their expected net return is given by USf = (pA + pH)
[
R−max
{
c
pA
, mpH ,
m+c
pA+pH
}]
− I.
• if A < ASam, farmers do not have access to credit.
As in Proposition 1, the farmer will not require supervision by the procurement agent if
A ≥ Aa.24 However, when the farmer has insufficient wealth (i.e., when A < Aa), he will accept
monitoring by the supermarket agent. Unlike the moneylender, the procurement agent agrees
to perform two tasks: monitoring and advising. As previously mentioned, for the procurement
agent to be diligent in both monitoring and advising, expression (3.23) should be verified. This
implies the following pledgeable income
RSs = R−
b
pH
−max
{
c
pA
,
m
pH
,
m+ c
pA + pH
}
. (3.26)
Thus, to obtain credit a farmer’s level of finance should be such that
A ≥ ASam = I − (pA + pH)
[
R− b
pH
−max
{
c
pA
,
m
pH
,
m+ c
pA + pH
}]
. (3.27)
Furthermore, by the same reasoning as in Proposition 1, it can be shown that the expected
net return of the farmer having access to credit can be expressed as:
USf = (pA + pH)
[
R−max
{
c
pA
,
m
pH
,
m+ c
pA + pH
}]
− I. (3.28)
24In this case, we assume that the loan is extended by the supermarket. In fact, nothing prevents the farmer
from borrowing from a bank to finance the inputs necessary for the project.
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Finally, it is easy to check that ΦSa = (pA + pH)Rp−m−c ≥ 0 forRp = max
{
c
pA
, mpH ,
m+c
pA+pH
}
.
Therefore, it is confirmed that the procurement agent always want to participate.
Having established Propositions 1 and 2, it seems natural to inquire about the relative
merit of both organizational forms. The next Proposition is the main result of this paper.
Proposition 3 [Monitoring and Advising]: At the first stage of the game, the supermarket
(weakly) prefers an organization, in which it finances farmers and hires a procurement agent
who both advises and monitors. In this organization, the number of farmers who obtain loans
strictly increases in comparison to an organization where advising and monitoring tasks are
left to distinct agents.
When the farmer has all bargaining power, the supermarket is indifferent between the two
types of organization. However, two (unmodelled) arguments can justify a preference by the
supermarket for having a large supply base. First, a supply base of numerous farmers who are
geographically dispersed acts as an effective mechanism to reduce the risk of widespread crop
failures due to disease and (to a lesser extent) weather. It thus safeguards the ability of the
supermarket to fulfill customer orders (Henson, Masakure and Boselie 2005). Second, a large
supply base can act as a switching cost reduction mechanism thereby decreasing the search
costs for new farmers.
The intuition behind the second part of the Proposition is as follows. Heuristically, by
contracting with the same agent on both tasks the supermarket creates an incentive comple-
mentarity between the two tasks. For instance, it is possible that the agent derives a substantial
rent by, say, monitoring diligently. Bundling and rewarding the two tasks in a single payment
enhances incentives, in the sense that the prospect of losing this rent makes the agent less
likely to overlook his advising duties. In other words, in this case, the agent is essentially a
free advisor. Conversely, the agent could derive a substantial rent in advising and the fear of
losing this (advising) rent would essentially make him a free monitor.
Arguably, such a feedback loop does not exist when both tasks are performed by distinct
agents. To see this formally, note that the minimum motivation cost necessary to insure proper
incentives when advising and monitoring are exerted by separate agents is
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MS =
c
pA
+
b
pH
+
m
pH
. (3.29)
MS is the sum of the farmer, moneylender and procurement agent payments consistent
with proper incentives. When both tasks are performed by the same agent, this sum reduces
to
MB =
b
pH
+ max
{
c
pA
,
m
pH
,
m+ c
pA + pH
}
< MS. (3.30)
Our result points to a beneficial role of supermarkets for farmers. However, it is important
to note that the occurrence of such contracts results in the disappearance of “traditional” mon-
eylenders in our model. In fact, as already noted by Conning (2000) in the Chilean context, the
expansion of contract farming by supermarkets or agroindustrial firms has essentially resulted
in the removal of traditional moneylending.
Corollary 1: Farmers prefer an organization of production where the tasks of advising and
monitoring are performed by the same agent.
This result is also a direct consequence of the fact that the bundling of both tasks reduces
the minimum rent necessary to insure proper incentives. This rent reduction leaves a larger
share of the project to be captured by farmers.
3.7 The supermarket holds the bargaining power
So far, all the bargaining power in the contractual relationship was in the hands of the
farmers. In reality, the balance of power between farmers and supermarkets arguably leans
toward the latter. We now study a situation in which the supermarket holds all the bargaining
power and proposes a sharing rule to the farmers and the procurement agent, in order to
maximize its expected profits, pi. In this contractual relationship, not only should farmers be
willing to exert effort, but also to participate. The participation constraint of a farmer is given
by
Uf = (pH + pA)Rf −A ≥ 0, (3.31)
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or Rf ≥ A/ (pH + pA). Thus, for the farmer to participate and exert effort it should be
that
Rf ≥ max
{
b
pH
,
A
pH + pA
}
. (3.32)
The problem of the supermarket is expressed as
Rsmax {pi = (pH + pA)Rs − (I −A)} (3.33)
subject to
R = Rf +Rp +Rs, (3.34)
Rf ≥ max
{
b
pH
,
A
pH + pA
}
, (3.35)
Rp ≥ max
{
c
pA
,
m
pH
,
m+ c
pA + pH
}
, (3.36)
(pH + pA)Rs ≥ I −A. (3.37)
Before we proceed, it is useful to define RSp = max
{
c
pA
, mpH ,
m+c
pA+pH
}
and
AI = (pH + pA)
(
RSp − c/pA − b/pH
)
, that are used in the following result.
Proposition 4: In the second stage of the game, the contract proposed by the supermarket
to the farmers and the procurement agent has the following features:
• if RSp = c/pA, the farmer accepts a production contract that stipulates monitoring and
advising by the procurement agent. The latter earns expected net return ΦSa . If
– A ≥ (pH + pA) b/pH , the supermarket earns pi = (pH + pA) [R− c/pA − b/pH ] − I,
while the farmer has no rent, i.e. Uf = 0.
– (pH + pA) b/pH > A ≥ ASam, the farmer’s net return is Uf = (pH + pA) b/pH −A >
0, while the supermarket’s expected profit is pi = (pH + pA) [R− c/pA − b/pH ] −
(I −A) .
• if RSp 6= cpA , then the farmer accepts a production contract. If
– A ≥ (pH + pA)B/pH , the farmer’s net return is Uf = 0 and the contract only
stipulates advising by the agent who earns Φa while pi = (pH + pA) [R− c/pA]− I.
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– (pH + pA)B/pH > A ≥ AI , the farmer’s net return is Uf = (pH + pA)B/pH −
A > 0. The contract only stipulates advising by the agent who earns Φa while
pi = (pH + pA) [R− c/pA −B/pH ]− (I −A).
– AI > A ≥ (pH + pA) b/pH , the farmer’s net return is Uf = 0. The contract stip-
ulates monitoring and advising by the agent who earns ΦSa . The supermarket’s
expected profit is pi = (pH + pA)
[
R−RSp
]
− I.
– (pH + pA) b/pH > A ≥ ASam, the farmer’s net return is Uf = (pH + pA) b/pH −A >
0. The contract stipulates monitoring and advising by the agent who earns ΦSa . The
supermarket’s expected profit is pi = (pH + pA)
[
R−RSp − b/pH
]
− (I −A) > 0.
• if A < ASam, the farmer does not obtain a production contract, i.e., Uf = 0.
One of the main findings of Proposition 4 is that loan extension is not influenced by whoever
holds the bargaining power. Indeed, as in Proposition 2, loan extension is up to a finance level
A = ASam. Thus, this result stems from the delegation to a single agent of the monitoring
and advising tasks, not from the bargaining power allocation. In our model, the bargaining
position of each player only determines how the surplus is allocated among all participants but
has no bearing on how many farmers are potentially entitled to produce.
This Proposition also provides insights on a focal issue in the empirical literature on super-
markets, namely the fate of small farmers in the emergence of these agroindustrial companies.
The equilibrium net returns of the farmer and the supermarket are represented as a function
of farmers’ wealth A. From panel (a), it seems clear that the supermarket has a monotonically
increasing preference for well-capitalized farmers. The nature of the relationship explains this
result. Indeed, in this relationship, the supermarket is essentially trying to extract diligent
care from farmers, using a combination of monitoring services and incentive payments. When
misbehaving, relatively wealthy farmers lose their initial outlay A and this is sufficient to keep
them on their toes and insure their diligence. With lower initial outlays, poorer farmers stand to
lose less from shirking, and the supermarket must insure diligence by relying relatively more on
incentive payments, which are costly. This result provides argument for the empirical literature
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describing the emergence of supermarkets in developing countries, which has forcefully argued
that supermarkets tend to contract with large, wealthy farmers, while poorer farmers are left
behind (see for instance, Dolan and Humphrey 2000 and Dolan, Humphrey and Harris-Pascal
2001).
Keeping in mind that, after rewarding the agent, the residual project surplus is shared
between the supermarket and the farmer, panel (b) is in fact a negative image of panel (a).
It shows that even though the supermarket designs the contract, some farmers do obtain
a positive surplus from their business relationship with the supermarket. For the reasons
explained above, this, in fact, benefits less capitalized farmers. Therefore, the existence of
strictly positive rents should attract more farmers. In fact, the long waiting list to enter
into the supermarket procurement system observed in many developing countries is at least
consistent with this result (on this issue, see Henson, Masakure and Boselie, 2005). If we
speculate that a supermarket tries to extend its grower base, then the upper hand of the
poorest farmers (i.e., those with level of finance such that A > ASam ) should benefit from
the implementation of the supermarket arrangement. These findings also seem consistent with
recent empirical evidence (Herna´ndez, Reardon and Berdegue´ 2007).
Although the implementation of such contracts by the supermarket seems to have socially
attractive properties, it is by no means clear that they are optimal in the sense that they
implement the highest possible surplus.
Corollary 2 [Excessive monitoring]: When RSp 6= cpA then the supermarket over monitors
farmers with a level of finance such that Aa < A < AI . This implies a social loss.
Such supermarket’s behavior arises because monitoring effectively transfers a rent from the
farmer to it. For a small additional payment, the supermarket assigns the agent an additional
monitoring task that ultimately results in (much) smaller incentive payments made to farm-
ers. Here, monitoring is not motivated by feasibility issues, but is just a socially costly rent
extraction mechanism. In the light of this theoretical finding, several recent puzzling empirical
results may, perhaps, find a natural explanation. For instance, Bellemare (2006) who analyses
production contracts between supermarkets and farmers, fails to find strong empirical support
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for monitoring by supermarkets as a means to raise farmer productivity. Such an observation
seems consistent with the result stated above.
Before concluding this section, we must note that an important assumption of our baseline
model is arguably the absence of specialization costs. Indeed, we assume that the supermarket
agent privately bears cost m+c when performing both tasks. Although it could be argued that
synergies might exist between the two tasks, one could also argue that there is convexity in effort
cost as the agent performs two tasks. It can be shown that the choice by the supermarket of this
type of organization is robust to the introduction of such convexity; that is, socially worthwhile
projects that would otherwise be infeasible are undertaken, even though the choice of a single
agent is cost inefficient. The supermarket tolerates some inefficiency in the performance of the
two tasks, as long as, the reduction in agency costs results in a higher profit.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper explores the peculiar relationship between supermarkets and farmers that exists
in developing countries. This relationship is modeled as a financial contract, where the farmer
provides effort to the supermarket in exchange not only for technical assistance, but also for
credit and infrastructure support. By doing so, we open the ”black box” of the supermarket
procurement system.
The motivation of the supermarket to provide not only input credits, but also technical
assistance in the framework is as follows. By combining monitoring and advising of farmers,
supermarkets reduce the agency cost and gain some advantage with respect to conventional
moneylenders. This agency cost reduction in turn may widen the scope for financing farmers.
This result holds true whether the supermarket or farmers hold the bargaining power. Even
more, if the multiplication of the tasks performed entails additional motivation costs, such
procurement organization will still be favored by the supermarket and remains potentially
conducive to credit extension to smaller farmers. Moreover, this result also provides a rationale
for recent empirical evidence that shows that the spread of supermarkets, far from leading to
the exclusion of poorer farmers, improves their credit access.
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However, the allocation of the bargaining power in the contractual relationship will deter-
mine the distributional effects of the spread of supermarkets. In particular, if the bargaining
power remains in the hands of the supermarket, we show that the supermarket will prefer
targeting the wealthiest producers. The intuition behind this result is as follows. Wealthier
farmers make substantially higher investments in the supermarket project. Thus, no financial
compensation is necessary to guarantee their diligence, unlike with poorer farmers. It is, thus,
more profitable for the supermarket to contract with wealthier farmers. Nevertheless, our
results show no reasons, for the supermarket, against the involvement of smallholders in its
procurement system. As it can still be profitable for the supermarket to contract with them.
Finally, when given sufficient bargaining power, we find that the supermarket endorses
monitoring as a socially costly rent extraction mechanism.
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CHAPTER 4. FISHING BEHAVIOR ACROSS SPACE AND TIME
Modified from a paper to be submitted in the Journal of Applied Econometrics
Quinn Weninger1 and Luc Veyssiere
4.1 Abstract
Models of fishing behavior rarely incorporate the complexities of marine ecosystems, multiple-
stock harvest technologies, and regulations present in real world marine fisheries. We introduce
a structural model of a multi-species, weak-output-disposability harvest technology. A latent
target-cost-minimizing share vector is estimated to link the technology to a spatially and tem-
porally heterogeneous fish stock. Data from the Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery is used to
estimate the model. The results provide a robust characterization of harvest and discard be-
havior across space and time. Our approach considerably improves methods used to study
fishing behavior and evaluate alternative fisheries management policies.
4.2 Introduction
Fisheries management problems have recently been linked to a reliance on overly simplis-
tic models of marine ecosystems. Single-species management principles that ignore complex
biological interactions among multiple species, or multiple age cohorts, and treatment of spa-
tially heterogeneous fish metapopulations as a spaceless whole stocks are examples.2 A similar
critique can be leveled at models of fishing behavior which often exhibit a considerable dis-
1Corresponding author
2A growing view among fisheries scientists and marine ecologists is that a more holistic approach will improve
the management of ocean fisheries resources (Brodziak and Link, 2002; Pikitch et al., 2004; U.S. Commission
on Ocean Policy, 2004). The challenges and opportunities that accompany spatial fisheries management are
discussed in Wilen (2004).
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connect between fundamentals, prices, technologies, stock conditions and regulations, and the
fishing outcomes that are of interest to managers. At the least, effective management of fish-
eries requires information on stocks-specific harvests across space and time, information on
bycatch and at-sea discarding, behavioral responses to prices and regulations, and tools to
evaluate biological and economic performance of alternative regulatory policies. An essential
requirement is that behavioral models be capable of examining the counterfactual, i.e., the be-
havioral responses of fishermen to regulations that have yet to be adopted. The problem calls
for a structural approach that can link management-relevant fishing outcomes to the complex
ecological, institutional and economic conditions in marine fisheries.
This paper introduces a novel approach to study the policy-relevant aspects of fishing
behavior within a biologically and spatially heterogeneous fishery.3 Commercial fishermen
decide where and when to fish jointly with choices of factor inputs to employ in the harvesting
process and the quantity and mix of individual fish species or sub-stocks to harvest. These
choices are constrained by the available technology, the composition of the fish stocks and often
by various harvest regulations. We introduce a structural economic model that takes as the
unit of analysis the spatial harvest and discard choices of fishermen. The model draws heavily
on the neo-classical theory of the firm, but is modified to account for the role of the in situ fish
stocks in the technology. We consider multiple-species, and/or multiple age cohort stocks that
are spatially and temporally heterogeneous, and therefore make considerable progress toward
incorporating the ecological complexity of real world fisheries.
A key element of our model is a latent vector of target-cost-minimizing harvest shares.
This vector summarizes spatial-temporal stock conditions and importantly the spatial-temporal
profit opportunities for fishermen. The latent cost share vector provides the crucial link be-
tween the technology and the spatially and temporally heterogeneous fish stock. A second key
feature is the technology itself, which we assume exhibits a weak-output disposibility prop-
erty consistent with costly targeting in multiple-species fisheries (Turner, 1995; Singh and
Weninger, 2009). Third, our approach controls directly for effects of regulations common in
3Berrmann (2007) discusses the various limitations of the random utility model for analyzing spatial fishing
behavior. See also Curtis and McConnell (2004).
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managed fisheries on fishing behavior.
An application to the Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery is presented to demonstrate the key
attributes. The Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery is a multiple-species fishery that is managed with
seasonal closures for some species stocks, per-trip catch limits, spatial closures, gear restrictions
and catch quotas. These regulations along with the weak output disposibility technology
lead to a complex decision environment which interacting constraints on the harvest choices
of fishermen. Our econometric model incorporates these constraints, in the form of unique
Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions, in the estimation of a parametric multiple-product cost
function. The system of estimating equations identifies further the latent stocks conditions
that determine the cost structure across space and time. A Gibbs sampler is used to fit the
model (see Casella and George, 1992 and Geweke et al., 1999).
Our analysis of reef fish harvest behavior demonstrates several of the model’s strengths.
We are able to show how prices, and regulation such as per-trip landings limits used to reduce
fishing mortality, redirect fishing efforts toward unregulated species and across space and time.
Spatial-temporal discard patterns are also impacted by price and regulatory changes. Our
model predicts that when the price of fuel rises, reef fish fishermen are less inclined to target
higher priced reef fish species, and instead are more inclined to land a harvest mix with low
targeting costs. The preferred harvest strategy under higher fuel prices also involves fewer
at-sea discards.
Before we present the model and empirical results, it is instructive to compare our approach
with related literature. Our model is similar in spirit to state space modeling (see Geweke and
Tanizaki, 2001 and for ecological applications see Punt and Hilborn, 1997). Ecologists have
long relied on state-space models to estimate latent fish biomass and its underlying dynamics.
We do not explicitly model stocks dynamics here; extensions of the model in this direction are
discussed in the concluding section. We do adopt some of the econometric techniques used in
the ecology literature. Recent advances have shown that Bayesian state space models perform
better in the estimation of highly non linear dynamic such as the logistic growth function,
which features many fish ecosystems (Wang, 2007).
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Current methods for analyzing spatial fishing patterns rely almost entirely on the discrete
choice random utility construct.4 A standard application of random utility models (RUMs)
to spatial fishing behavior assumes that on each trip from port, the fisherman selects, from
among a set of spatially disjoint (discrete) fishing opportunities or sites, the opportunity that
yields the highest utility.5 Our model also exploits the heterogeneity of the ocean environment
for determining spatial behavior, but we do not discretize space or time. The number of sites
at which fishermen might deploy gear in a fishery is typically far too large to be estimated
via a multinomial probit or multinomial logit specification. This places artificial limits on
the number of sites for which preferences may be estimated and forces researchers to assume
coarse geographical divisions of the fishing grounds, with coarse descriptions of spatial fishing
patterns (Berman, 2007).6 Our approach of treating space and time continuously is therefore
an important advance.
Moreover, application of the RUM to fishing data takes as the unit of analysis the spatial
location of a fishing trip. A second-stage model of input and output choices on each trip is
required by the researcher in order to complete the link between fundamentals and harvests,
bycatch revenues and costs. Our model considers the choice of spatial location jointly with
the input and harvest choices that are made on the trip. As we demonstrate, this allows
us to directly predict management-relevant fishing behavior which is crucial for management
purposes.
Estimation procedures that incorporate Kuhn Tucker necessary conditions are common
in the analysis of consumer demand systems, and valuation of non-marketed goods (see von
Haefen, and Phaneuf, 2007 for a review of this literature). Kuhn Tucker estimation is less
common in applied production analysis (an exception is Lee and Pitt, 1987). Whereas in
4The random utility model (RUM) was developed by Daniel McFadden to study transportation choices. The
original set up assumes that a particular transportation choice yields utility U which is known fully by the
decision maker. Utility is decomposed as U = V + e, where V is observable by the researcher, while e captures
an unobserved component. In empirical applications V may be conditioned on observables such as distance to
a destination, average traffic patterns, road conditions, etc.
5Numerous applications of the RUM to spatial fishing data have appeared in the resource economics literature.
We do not attempt a review of this literature. A special issue of Marine Resource Economics (Volume 19, Number
1, 2004) is dedicated to analysis of spatial fishing behavior. Smith (2000) provides an overview of the RUM
method for analyzing spatial fishing data.
6Branch et al. (2005) discusses a related problems where the spatial grid used to divide fisheries
geographically—typically latitude and longitude designations determined by political considerations—may be
unrelated to the locations of productive fishing sites.
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demand systems consumer utility is not observable, in our fishing profit maximization problem
we observe costs but do not observe the composition of the fish stock at the locations chosen
for fishing. We incorporate species-specific KT necessary conditions for optimal harvesting,
along with the trip-level cost function. Estimating the system of equations improves parameter
identification and directly accommodates the impacts of regulations, e.g., landing constraints
that impact our data.
We choose to use Bayesian methods as they present computational advantages over fre-
quentist methods in both fitting non linear equations and estimating random parameters.
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods simulate the posterior but do not maximize
the likelihood function (Chernozhukov and Hong, 2003). Bayesian estimation approaches are
capable of estimating models for which extremum-based estimators fail to converge. Further-
more in Bayesian frameworks random parameters are accommodated by the appropriate choice
of priors. These hierarchical priors introduce an additional structure in the model which eases
estimation (Chib and Carlin, 1999).7,8
Our model allows for random vessel skipper effects. We adopt a hierarchical prior and use a
Metropolis Hasting algorithm to draw from the posterior of our non linear systems of equations
(Kim, et al., 2002).9 Our structural approach unlike Kim, et al. (2002) accommodates not
only for lower binding constraints, zero harvests, but also for upper binding constraints on
choice variables. In our case the upper-bound constraint is due a per-trip landings regulations
imposed by the fisheries management program. To our knowledge this paper is the first to
incorporate both types of corner solutions.
The next section presents a multiple-factor input, multiple-species behavioral model in a
landings-regulated fishery. Our empirical estimation strategy is also presented. Section 4.4
presents a brief overview of the Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery, the available data and a
7Remark that data augmentation methods (Tanner and Wong, 1987) used for Bayesian inference in RUM
greatly eases the computational burden of these models and can significantly extend the location choice set
considered (see McCulloch and Rossi, 1994 and Imai and van Dyk, 2005).
8While there is no clear advantage in estimating KT systems with either Bayesian or frequentist methods, in
the presence of random parameters the Bayesian methods are often preferred (von Haefen and Phaneuf, 2007).
9The Bayesian inference approach in Kim, et al., (2002) identifies parameters of consumers preferences for
varieties of yogurt. Their procedure remains a reduced form approach because of the absence of data on consumer
preferences and thereby only partially identifies behavioral parameters. On the contrary our structural model
uses data on the cost function for identification.
58
discussion of the regulations used to protect reef fish stocks. Section 4.5 reports results and
demonstrates use of the model for designing regulatory policies. Section 4.6 summarizes the
main insights of the paper and discusses extensions.
4.3 Model
We consider a representative, profit maximizing fisherman who harvests from i = 1, ...,m >
1 differentiated fish stocks. Individual stocks can differ by species, age cohort or sex. Denote
the non-negative harvest vector as h = (h1, ..., hm). The optimization problem is analyzed in
two stages; a cost minimization stage followed by a profit-maximizing harvest choice.
4.3.1 Multiple-stocks harvest technology
In a fishery, the cost of harvesting h will depend on factor input prices, but also on the
composition, i.e., the absolute and relative abundance of individual fish stocks. We allow
the spatial and temporal distribution of the stocks to be heterogenous. Stock composition
at a particular location and time can vary depending on the spatial-temporal microhabitat.
Abundance at spatial location s ∈ S and date t is denoted xst = (x1,st, ..., xm,st), where xi,st is
stock i abundance, and S is the set of all fishing locations on the fishing ground.10 We assume
that harvest h is small relative to stock abundance and treat xst parametrically.
Date t minimum costs are defined as
c(h,w, xst) = min
v,s
{w′v|vcanharvesthgivenxst, s ∈ S}, (4.1)
where v is a vector of factor inputs (e.g., fuel, bait, ice, labor, and capital), that is purchased
competitively at price vector, w > 0. We assume the cost function is convex in h and non-
decreasing, concave and linearly homogeneous in w. These are standard structural properties
of multi-product technologies. Additional structural properties unique to fishing technologies
are discussed next (see Singh and Weninger, 2009 for further details).
Minimizing the cost of harvesting h will in general involve selecting fishing locations where
the composition of the stock is well-suited given the harvest target h. To be more precise, if
10The spatial location index s may for example, indicate the lattitude, longitude and depth of water column.
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a fisherman chooses to harvest a relatively large quantity of stock i fish he will likely select
a location at which xi is abundant in absolute terms and abundant relative to other stocks.
At this location, the fishing gear can be expected to intercept stock i in roughly the same
proportion as the target vector h. Moving vessels and gear across space utilizes costly inputs.
Therefore the fishing location must be optimally chosen jointly with the target harvests to
balance costs and benefits of targeting a particular mix of stocks.
Notice that the optimization problem in (4.1) is defined over locations s, whereas the spatial
index remains attached to our stock measure, xst. Commercial fishing involves steaming from
port to a preferred location and then returning to port to off-load and sell the catch. Vessel
operations are mobile and regularly operate from different ports. However, each fishing trip
must depart from, and return to some land-based port, and thus the production process is spa-
tially linked to land.11 Our model allows the costs of accessing a particular stock composition
to differ across coarse regions of the fishing ground.
We assume the technology exhibits the non-standard structural property of weak output
disposibility (Turner, 1995, 1997; Singh and Weninger, 2009). An important implication of this
property is that costs can be non-monotonic in h and specialization, i.e., selecting a harvest
mix with hi = 0 for some i and hj > 0 for j 6= i, can be costly. To see why this property is
reasonable in multiple-stock fisheries, compare the costs associated with the following harvest
vectors. The first, denoted h+, has strictly positive quantities for each species (h+i > 0, for all
i). The second h0 is identical with the exception that harvest of the species i stock is zero;
h0 = (h+1 , .., h
+
i−1, 0, h
+
i+1, .., h
+
m). Well-suited fishing locations, given the target h
0, may be
quite limited since it is likely difficult, maybe impossible, to avoid intercepting some stock i
when it is present at a location.12 Adjusting factor inputs, e.g., changing the mesh size on
fishing nets, altering bait and hook configurations, could enhance gear selectivity and avoid
intercepting stock i when it is present at a location. However these adjustments are expected
to be costly.
11Researchers have conditioned the location choice on the port from which the vessel departs (Haab et al.,
2008). The choice departure and landing port is likely part of a dynamic optimization problem that is a topic
of future research.
12If the mix of stocks is distributed homogeneously across the fishing ground, and gear is less than fully
selective, the set of fishable locations with xi,st = 0 and xj,st > 0, j 6= i will be empty and c(h0, w, xst) =∞.
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Next compare the costs of harvesting strictly positive vector h+. It is reasonable that the
subset of fishable locations will expand. More generally, fewer factor inputs will be utilized in
avoiding stock i fish. The implication is c(h+, w, xst) < c(h
0, w, xst). Although ultimately an
empirical question, weak output disposibility, or non-monotonicity of the cost function under
stock condition found in most multiple-stock fisheries, is distinctly possible.
Let ci ≡ ∂c(h,w, xst)/∂hi denote the marginal cost of harvesting the species i stock at
(s, t). The weak output disposibility property is summarized with the following condition.
Condition1: Set hj > 0 for some j 6= i, then ci(h,w, xst) < 0 at harvest quantity hi = 0 is
permitted.
The above condition implies that there can exist a strictly positive harvest quantity at
which marginal cost is zero. Marginal costs are negative at smaller harvests because factor
inputs that would otherwise be used to avoid intercepting stock i are saved. Condition 1
implies that marginal rate of output substitution can be positive over a range of harvest levels.
It is this property that underlies the bycatch problem in fisheries and under certain regulations
provides an incentive to discard fish at sea.
4.3.2 Targeting behavior
We next consider the profit maximizing harvest choices. In many fisheries harvesting
activities are subject to stock-specific regulations designed to control total fishing mortality.
Following Singh and Weninger (2009), we assume that regulations are directed at the quantities
of fish landed at port. Denote landings and discards of stock i as li ≥ 0 and di ≥ 0, respectively.
It should be emphasized that the minimum cost function in (4.1) is defined over harvested fish,
h = (l1 + d1, ..., lm + dm).
The regulations we consider are landings constraints that are strictly enforced at the fish
dock. We assume that at-sea harvests are unobserved by the manager and are not subject to
penalty. Let l = (l1, ..., lm) denote the maximum legal landings quantity for stock i fish; li = 0
simulates a closed harvest season for stock i.
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The Lagrangian for the profit maximization problem is given as
= p · l − c(l + d,w, xst)− λ · (l − l¯), (4.2)
where p ∈ <m+ is the output price vector and λ ∈ <m+ is a vector of Lagrange multipliers (vector
conformability is assumed). Necessary conditions for optimal landings and discards, denoted
l∗ and d∗, respectively, are given as
pi − ci(l∗ + d∗, w, xst)− λi ≤ 0, if l∗i > 0; λi
(
l∗i − l¯i
)
= 0, i = 1, ...,m, (4.3)
−ci(l∗ + d∗, w, xst) ≤ 0, d∗i ci(l∗ + d∗, w, xst) = 0, i = 1, ...,m, (4.4)
l∗i ≤ l¯i, i = 1, ...,m, di, λi ≥ 0 i = 1, ...,m, (4.5)
Suppose that prices at the dock are strictly positive for the moment, and that the landings
constraint does not bind. In this case λ∗ = 0 and the necessary condition in (4.3) indicates
the optimal harvest vector satisfies a familiar condition with the price of stock i equal to its
marginal cost. We see also that at h∗ marginal cost is positive (since pi > 0). Equation (4.4)
implies therefore that d∗ = 0 or alternatively h∗ = l∗; all harvested fish is landed at port.
Under strictly positive prices and no regulation, discarding is not part of a profit maximizing
fishing strategy (Turner, 1995).
Now suppose one or more landings constraints bind. Consider first an extreme case where
landing stock i is prohibited, l¯i = 0, for example in the case of a stock-specific closure. Assume
fishing remains profitable, i.e., l∗j > 0 for some j. Profit maximization requires, c∗i = 0 as
indicated in (4.4). An optimal fishing strategy will involve positive discards if marginal costs
are negative at zero harvest quantity. Under the weak output disposibility technology it may
be less costly to harvest and discard species i fish than take costly efforts to avoid intercepting
it with the fishing gear. The implication is that harvests and mortality, unless discarded fish
are unharmed, are strictly positive under a stock-specific landings closure. A final observation
is that the behavioral implications for a zero dockside price and a landings constraint l¯i = 0
are identical.
Notice further that c∗i = 0 from the necessary condition (4.3). This implies that λ∗i = pi;
the shadow price of the stock i landings constraint is equal to the dockside price.
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Next consider the case with l¯i > 0 and suppose the landings constraint binds, l
∗
i = l¯i. From
(4.3) we see that λi > 0 and pi > c
∗
i . If discards are positive, d
∗
i > 0, equation (4.4) requires
c∗i = 0, and from (4.3), we see that λ∗i ≥ pi. Alternatively, suppose l¯i > 0 and that d∗i = 0.
Equation (4.4) requires c∗i > 0, which occurs at strictly positive harvest level, and since d∗i = 0
we have 0 < h∗i = l∗i < l¯i. However, if the landing constraint does not bind, λ∗i = 0, and
therefore pi − c∗i = 0.
The remaining sections estimate a parametric cost function consistent with the struc-
tural properties of a costly-targeting technology and the KT necessary conditions for profit-
maximizing harvest behavior.
4.3.3 Empirical model
We adopt the following empirical cost function for estimation:
c(h,w, s, ϕst|γ, pi, β)=
[
1 +mi=1 γv (θi − ϕi,st)2
]
· g(h,w, s|β). (4.6)
The function in (4.6) decomposes cost into targeting costs, which are measured by the first
bracketed term and non-targeting cost, measured by the function g (.). An explanation of the
structure and notation used in each component is presented next.
Targeting costs: Notice first that the stock variable, xst has been replaced with the vector
ϕst = (ϕ1,st, ..., ϕm,st), where ϕi,st ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, ...,m. The vector ϕst is a minimum-target-
cost share vector for location s and date t. The term θi = hi/
m
i=1hi in (4.6) is the share of stock
i fish in the harvest vector. The parameter, γv ≥ 0 is a targeting cost parameter for fishermen
v. We use V to denote the set of fishermen.
If a fisherman chooses harvest h such that θi = ϕi,st, for all i, the square-bracketed term
in (4.6) will equal unity, and harvest costs are given as g(h,w, s|β). In this case no targeting
efforts are necessary to harvest the vector h. This is admittedly a stylized construct, since
explicit separation of costs into targeting and non-targeting components is difficult to envision
in practice. The no-target-cost vector ϕst is simply a means to summarize the targeting-
relevant features of the fish stock at various (s, t) combinations. Notice that if γv > 0 the
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term mi=1γv (θi − ϕi,st)2 increases with the Euclidean distance between θ and ϕst. Therefore
harvesting costs rise with the added effort that is required to harvest a mix os species that
differs from the mix implicit in ϕst.
We allow targeting costs to vary across skippers to allow for heterogeneity in targeting
ability which is likely linked to such factors as skipper experience. The parameter γv measures
the rate at which costs increase for skipper v as the harvest share θ deviates from ϕst.
Non-targeting costs: The function g(h,w, s|β) is assumed to be strictly positive for
h > 0, non-decreasing and convex in h, and non-decreasing, concave and linearly homogeneous
in w. For our empirical application to the Gulf reef fish fishery g is specified as
g = exp(β0 + β1h1 + ...+ βmhm + βss+ βsss
2) ·KβKwβw ; (4.7)
K denotes vessel length and will proxy for the capital endowed to the fishing operation, and
w will hereafter denote the price of fuel.
Inclusion of a proxy for capital reflects the short run nature of the harvest problem that
we analyze below. Prices for other factor inputs such as bait, ice and groceries, could not be
constructed from our data. The crew wage is discussed shortly.
Inclusion of the space index in (4.7), which we enter quadratically, is intended to capture
non-targeting cost differences over the fishing ground. Changes in absolute stocks abundance,
fishing depths or crew labor quality across regions of the fishery are examples.
The specification in (4.7) is convex in individual stock harvest levels if β1, .., βm are positive.
The function is jointly convex in h if iβi > 0. The function g is increasing and concave in w if
βw ∈ (0, 1]. Linear homogeneity could be easily imposed if multiple-input prices were available.
Our data include a single price and therefore the linear homogeneity property is not considered
below. If vessel length is a normal input in the production process, harvest costs will be non-
increasing and concave in K.
Special cases of the multi-stock targeting technology arise under particular values of γv.
As γv →∞ the technology exhibits fixed output proportions, i.e., costs become infinite unless
θ = ϕst. This case can represent an harvest technology whereby fishermen cannot influence the
mix of harvested stocks. Independence across harvested stocks occurs if γv = 0 and g(h,w, s|β)
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is chosen appropriately (see May et al., 1979; Clark, 1990; Boyce, 1996). A test of the null
hypothesis, γv = 0 is therefore a test of the structural property of costly targeting (weak output
disposibility).
Minimum-target-cost share vector: Estimates of stock specific abundance across space
and time is not available in our data, or for any fishery that we are aware of. Therefore the
minimum-target-cost share vector is treated as a latent variable that must be estimated. We
require a parsimonious specification of the vector ϕst. Since s and t are continuous variables,
our state space is infinitely large. A curse of dimensionality must be overcome in order to
summarize the cost impacts of ϕst over space and time. One approach is to discretize the state
space, i.e., divide the fishery into subregions and time intervals and assume ϕst is constant
within each subregion/calendar period combination. This approach has several flaws: (1)
the choice of sub-regions and time intervals requires considerable information about spatial-
temporal habitat variation; (2) there is no reason to expect ϕst changes abruptly at the spatial
and temporal boundaries that are chosen, and (3) the number of subregion/calendar period
combinations, and therefore unique values of ϕst that must be estimated, is likely to be excessive
in most fisheries.
Our approach is to assume that spatial and temporal changes in the composition of the
fish stocks can be represented by a smooth and continuous function of s and t. We adopt the
following functional specification for our estimation:
ϕi,st =
exp(fi(s, t|pii))
1 + exp(fi(s, t|pii)) , i = 1, ...,m. (4.8)
where pii are parameters to be estimated. The function fi(s, t|pii) ∈ <. The transformation in
equation (4.8) ensures ϕi,st ∈ [0, 1].13
In our empirical application f is specified as;
fi(s, t, y|pii) = pii,0 + pii,ss+ pii,sss2 + pii,yy + pii,yyy2 + pii,t(t− t2). (4.9)
In our empirical application s is a spatial index denoting the geographical subregion of fishing,
13Our assumptions for (4.8) do not guarantee that
∑
i
ϕi,st = 1 at each (s, t) combination. This does not
detract from the model’s ability to summarize the minimum targeting costs over space and time.
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and t is the day of the year that a fishing trip begins. The variable y is cumulative days since
the beginning of our data period. The latent stock share model is therefore capable of capturing
spatial and seasonal variation, as well as longer term changes in the composition of the fish
stock. The function in (4.9) addresses the dimensionality problem; in our case, characterizing
ϕi,st requires that we identify seven parameters for each of the m fish species/stocks harvested
by the fishermen in our data.14 Note also that the specification in (4.8) provides a framework
to test for spatial and temporal variation in the composition of the stocks, e.g., tests of the
null hypotheses that fi is constant across space or time or both (i.e., fi(s, t|pii) = pii,0) is easily
implemented.
Crew shares: A final consideration is labor remuneration in fisheries data. The lay system
by which hired captains and crew are paid a share of trip revenues is ubiquitous in marine
commercial fisheries. As pointed by McConnell and Price (2004) the lay system can have
implications for fishing behavior. If we denote by ηc the share of trip revenue that is paid to
the crew, variable trip profits in (4.2) become: ηpl − c(l + d,w, xst)− λ · (l − l¯).
In the above η = 1 − ηc denotes the residual share of the trip revenue that accrues to the
vessel skipper, who we assume is responsible for trip-level harvests decisions. Information on
crew shares in our data is incomplete, and we therefore estimate the parameter η = 1− ηc.
4.3.3.1 Error structure
We assume that the fishermen in our data are aware of ϕst, i.e., are knowledgeable about the
spatial-temporal composition of the fish stock over the fishing ground.15 The stock composition
is however unobserved by the researcher. Similarly, vessel skipper know their own target cost
parameter γv. Target costs are unobserved by the econometrician. We assume γv is distributed
normally in our sample with mean γ¯ and variance σ2γ . γv ∼ N
(
γ¯, σ2γ
)
.
The estimating equations of our model include the empirical cost function introduced in
14Higher-order polynomials and cross terms would increase the flexibility of the model. The added flexibility
was deemed to be unnecessary in our application.
Discretizing the state space would be problematic with over 21 subregions and roughly 3.75 years of data. For
example, if we assume stock conditions are constant during each quarter (year) there would be 345 (92) distinct
values of ϕi,st for i = 1, ...,m to be estimated.
15We do not require the assumption that individual fishermen possess knowledge of xst over the entire fishing
ground.
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equation (4.6), and corresponding Kuhn Tucker necessary conditions for optimal targeting. To
simplify notation, we collect the observed data for a representative fishing trip into the row
vector z = [1, h1, ...hm, s, w,K, t, y]. Moreover let A(z|γ, pi) = [1+γv (θi − ϕi,st)2], the marginal
cost of harvesting stock i is given as ci (z|γv, pi, β, ϕ) =
[
∂A
∂hi
+A ∂g∂hi
]
g (.) + εi.
In the above, εi, is an error term associated with KT necessary conditions i = 1, ...,m. A
random term, ε0 which we assume is distributed N(0, σ
2
0) is also appended to our cost function
equation (4.6). The random vector ε = (ε0, ε1, ..., εm) is assumed normally distributed with
zero mean and diagonal covariance matrix Σ.16 Hereafter, σ20 and σ
2
i will denote the variance
of ε0 and εi, respectively.
The behavioral model introduced above implies the following KT restriction on εi:
Ri =

εi = ci (z|γv, pi, β, ϕ)
εi < ci (z|γv, pi, β, ϕ)
εi = ci (z|γv, pi, β, ϕ)− ηpi
εi > ci (z|γv, pi, β, ϕ)− ηpi
if li = 0anddi > 0
if li = 0anddi = 0
if0 < li < l¯i
if li = l¯i
.. (4.10)
We index the trip level observations with subscript n = 1...N . From the KT restrictions
in (4.10) and our assumptions for the error terms, the likelihood function for Zn = (cn, zn) is
given as
L(Zn|Γ) = φ0
(
εn0|0, σ20
)m
i=1
∫
Rni
φi
(
εni|σ2i
)
dεni,where Γ = {β, γv, η, pi,Σ}, and Rni reflects
the regulatory constraint for stock i on trip n. Letting Z = {Zn}Nn=1 we have the following
likelihood for our data
L (Z|Γ) =Nn=1 L (Zn|Γ) (4.11)
4.4 The Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery
The Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery is a complex of bottom-dwelling species consisting of
snappers, groupers, tilefishes, amberjacks, triggerfishes, grunts, porgies, and a host of others.
Reef fish fishermen also intercept coastal pelagic species such mackerel, dolphin (wahoo), sharks
16Specification of a general covariance matrix (e.g., Kim, et al., 2002) is reserved for future work.
67
and tuna. The two major gear types in the fishery are vertical hook and line gear and longline
gear. The US portion of the fishery extends from the US border with Mexico in the western
Gulf to the Florida Keys. There are 21 subregions of the fishery. Hereafter subregions 13-21
will be referred to as the western region, and subregions 1-12 as the eastern region of the reef
fish fishery.
The composition of the reef fish stocks varies across western and eastern regions. Groupers
are the most important species, by landed pounds and revenue, in the east, with red and gag
groupers dominating landings and revenue. National Marine Fisheries Service log book data
indicate that red and gag grouper account for 44% of total annual landings, and 50% of annual
revenue in the eastern Gulf region (pounds are reported as gutted weight, and prices, revenues
and costs are in first quarter 2008 US dollars.) The largest volume and revenue species in the
western Gulf region is red snapper which accounts for roughly 49% of the total landed pounds
and 59% of total revenue annually.
4.4.1 Data
The data available for analysis are from the National Marine Fisheries Service log book re-
porting system and a survey of annual operating expenses that was conducted by the Southeast
Fisheries Science Center. Regulations require that following each reef fish trip, vessel operators
record harvests by species, gear type used, primary subregion of fishing, number of crew on
board the vessel and other trip characteristics. In 2003, a “Trip Expense & Payment Section”
was added to the logbook form which recorded revenue by species, and expenses for fuel, bait,
ice, and food. Beginning in 2005, expense and payment data collection became mandatory for
a stratified sample of the permitted reef fish vessels. A second stratified sample of reef fish
fishermen record discards by species. The data that we use in our analysis consists of the set
of vessel operations that record both expenses and discards .
Our data are from January, 2005 through August, 2008. There are 1,753 trip-level observa-
tions with complete information on trip expenses and discards. Of these, 75 records included
entries that we deemed to be outliers. Trips that recorded extreme costs per landed pound were
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deemed outliers; observations with costs less than $0.04 per pound and in excess of $2.50 per
pound were dropped. Furthermore we removed fishing trip in subregion 12 which corresponds
to the New Orleans estuary. Finally we deemed landings of more than 10,000 pounds of one
particular species to be non-typical (the average landings of all species for vertical line gear is
1,854.61 pounds) .Remaining data includes 1,518 vertical line gear trips and 170 longline trips.
The empirical results that follow are for vertical line gear.
Tractability requires that individual reef fish species be aggregated to form output groups.
The four major species harvested include: h1- red snapper; h2- vermilion snapper; h3- red
grouper; and h4- gag grouper. The remaining species were aggregated into output groups
based on similarity in harvesting practices, e.g., fishing locations, depths, bait, and capture
methods, used to in harvesting.17 This resulted in three additional outputs: h5- Deep water
groupers and tilefishes; h6- Coastal pelagics and sharks, and h7- Other reef fish species.
We take as our spatial index, the coarse geographical region that yielded the bulk of the
each trip’s catch. The index takes the value of 1 on trips taken in the Florida Keys and 21 for
trips taken in waters off the southern Texas coast. It should be emphasized that additional
and finer-grained information on fishing location (e.g., latitude, longitude and fishing depth)
if available could be incorporated into the model described above. Our data lists the date that
the catch is landed at port. We specify a time index t which indicate the day of the year that
landings are recorded, and an index y which is set equal to the cumulative days since January
1, 2005; y therefore ranges from 1 through 1,380. We impose the restriction that the seasonal
effect on January 1 equal the effect on December 31 of each year. Both t and y are normalized
to line on the unit interval.
17Harvested quantities within each output category are aggregated linearly. The aggregation procedure as-
sumes that optimal input choices and aggregate output levels can be chosen independently of the mix of species
within each output category. The harvest technology is thus assumed to exhibit weak output separability.
Linear aggregation implies a constant rate of transformation among species within each output group. These
assumptions are consistent with fishing practices as described to us by reef fish fishermen. Nonetheless, it should
be noted that output aggregation could bias the results that follow.
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4.4.2 Regulations
The Gulf of Mexico Fisheries Management Council is responsible for the management of
Gulf reef fish. A host of regulations including vessel entry (fleet size) restrictions, gear and area
restrictions, seasonal closures, per-trip catch limits and recently individual fishing quotas are
used to limit the aggregate harvest of the commercial fleet. Possibly the most regulated species
in the reef fish complex is red snapper. Prior to December 2007 red snapper was managed under
controlled access regulations. Under this system an annual total allowable catch (TAC) was
selected by managers and enforced with fishery closures and a per-trip endorsement program.18
The endorsement program restricts landings of red snapper on each fishing trip, during red
snapper openings. Vessel operators held either a class 1 permit to land 2,000 pounds per trip,
a class 2 permit to land 200 pounds per-trip, or no permit at all. Vessels that do not own an
endorsement permit are prohibited from landing red snapper at any time.
In an effort to spread the annual red snapper harvest more evenly throughout each year, red
snapper landings were permitted during the first 10 days of each month. When the cumulative
fleet harvest reached the annual TAC, the fishery was closed until the following year. The
implications for fishing behavior during the controlled access management period (1/1/05-
12/31/06) are summarized in the following table.19
Regulation Opt. landings/discards KT necess. cond.
1. li = 0 l
∗
i = 0, d
∗
i > 0 c
∗
i (h
∗, x) = 0
2. li = 200 (2, 000) l
∗
i > 0, d
∗
i = 0 ηpi − c∗i (h∗, x) ≥ 0
3. li = 200 (2, 000) l
∗
i > 0, d
∗
i > 0 c
∗
i (h
∗, x) = 0
Beginning in January 2007 red snapper controlled access regulations were replaced with
individual fishing quotas (IFQs). Under the IFQ program, vessel operators can legally land
any quantity of red snapper as long as they possess quota to cover landings. The IFQ program
was begun by issuing red snapper quota gratis to qualifying fishermen. The amount of quota
18The red snapper TAC was set at 4.65 million pounds in 2005 and 2006. Stock concerns led to reductions in
the TAC in 2007, to 3.315 million pounds, and a further reduction in 2008, to 2.55 million pounds.
19A minimum size restriction of 15” total length was in place during 2005-06. The length restriction was
reduced to 13” total length in 2007-08.
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that was distributed was based on historical participation, i.e., history of red snapper landings
during designated qualifying years. Therefore, vessels that held class 1 endorsement permits
under the controlled access regime tended to receive larger shares of red snapper IFQ. The
implications for fishing behavior during the IFQ management period (1/1/07-08/31/08) are
summarized in the following table.
Regulation Opt. landings/discards KT necess. cond.
1. li = 0 l
∗
i = 0, d
∗
i > 0 c
∗
i (h
∗, x) = 0
2. li =∞ l∗i > 0, d∗i = 0 ηpi − c∗i (h∗, x) ≥ 0
Grouper species are also heavily regulated. Red grouper is managed as part of a shal-
low water grouper complex, which includes Black, Gag, Red, Yellowfin, Scamp, Yellowmouth
groupers, Rock Hind and Red Hind. The shallow water grouper fishery is closed when a red
grouper TAC of 5.31 million pounds is reached, or when a TAC of 8.80 million pounds for
all shallow water groupers is reached (the closure occurs at the first date either constraint is
met). In addition, measures are used to protect fish during heightened spawning activity. The
red and gag grouper fisheries are closed from February 15 through March 15 of each year. An
aggregate trip limit of 6,000 pounds of shallow water and deep water groupers combined was
introduced for the 2006 fishing season.
Deep water groupers and tilefishes, hereafter DWG, are also managed under controlled
access regulations. Fishermen face a per-trip limit of 6,000 pounds and the fishery is closed
when the annual TAC is reached. The commercial deepwater grouper TAC is currently set
as 1.02 million pounds. The commercial tilefish TAC is currently set at 440,000 pounds.
There are no size limits for deepwater grouper species or tilefish since these fish do not survive
retrieval from the depths in which they are caught. The behavioral implications of regulations
on groupers and other species are available from the authors upon request.
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Variable description Parm. Median Std. dev. 95% c.i.
Constant β0 -2.292 0.021 [-2.334, -2.253]
Fuel price βw 0.504 0.009 [0.488, 0.526]
Vessel length βK 1.119 0.015 [1.095, 1.156]
Sub-region βs 1.170 0.012 [1.146, 1.194]
Sub-region2 βss -0.080 0.019 [-0.116, -0.037]
Red snapper β1 0.109 0.004 [0.102, 0.116]
Verm. snapper β2 0.132 0.008 [0.120, 0.148]
Red grouper β3 0.251 0.007 [0.239, 0.265]
Gag grouper β4 0.249 0.012 [0.220, 0.269]
DWG/Tilefishes β5 0.231 0.010 [0.208, 0.245]
Coastal pelagic/sharks β6 0.269 0.011 [0.246, 0.291]
Other species β7 0.138 0.007 [0.126, 0.153]
Crew shares η 0.546 0.005 [0.536, 0556]
Targ. cost (mean) γ¯ 3.090 0.074 [2.953, 3.247]
Targ. cost. (var.) σ2γ 4.686 0.603 [3.655, 6.029]
Table 4.1 Posterior parameter distribution. Table reports the median,
standard deviation (Std. dev.) and 95% confidence intervals
of the posterior parameter distribution.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Posterior simulation results
Tables 4.1 report median values, standard deviations, and 95% confidence intervals of the
posterior parameter distribution The individual parameter distributions are consistent with
our assumptions for the structure of the harvest technology, and profit maximizing harvest
choices under a costly targeting technology.
The results suggests that trip-level costs are increasing and concave in the fuel price; the
posterior median value of βw is 0.504, with 95% confidence interval [0.488, 0.526]. The posterior
distribution for βK has median value 1.119, and 95% confidence interval, [1.095, 1.156]. The
result is consistent with trip-level costs that are increasing and convex in vessel length. At
first glance this result seems counterintuitive. One would expect capital to be a normal input
in production. However, larger boats tend to harvest more fish per trip, i.e., have a larger
hold capacity, which can yield a return to scale. Moreover, larger vessels are better-able to
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fish in sever weather conditions. They can harvest more fish annually than smaller boats, and
therefore incur lower average fixed operating costs.20 This advantage is not reflected in the
trip-level data. It is also possible that our proxy for capital services, which is a stock variable,
does not fully reflect the capital services available for production on a fishing trip.
The posterior median for γv is 3.090 (c.i. [2.953, 3.247]), and the posterior median for σ
2
v
is 4.686 (c.i. [3.655, 6.029]). The results indicate considerable variation in targeting ability
across skippers in our data, which is not uncommon in the analysis of harvesting performance
(e.g., Squires and Kirkley, 1999).
The latent harvest share parameters pii are generally well-identified.
Simulations that follow below suggest that the fitted values of ϕst are generally consistent
with landing patterns and available biological information on stock abundance across space
and time. Although it is tempting to view ϕst as an index of absolute stock abundance, we
feel this interpretation is premature.
Finally the posterior median for η is 0.5461 which means that crews receive roughly 45%
of the trip revenue. The posterior median is very close to the value from the log book data;
the median crew share reported in the 2005-08 log book data is 44.21%.
Further interpretation of the results may be best-accomplished by examining their impli-
cations for fishing behavior. Space constraints do not permit a comprehensive demonstration.
The following simulations highlight some of the more interesting aspects of fishing (target-
ing) behavior, and the influence of regulations in the reef fish fishery, that are implied by our
estimation results.
4.5.2 Simulations
This section reports the results from several simulation exercises. In each simulation we
draw with replacement a random sample of 1,000 vectors from the posterior parameter dis-
tribution.21 For each draw, we use a numerical optimization routine to solve for the profit
maximizing harvest and discard vectors for a representative vessel operation (equation (4.2)).
20A 1% increase in vessel length correlates with a 3% increase in harvest size per trip.
21We do not incorporate optimization error in our simulations.
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We solve the optimization problem for each subregion of the reef fish fishery thus obtaining
optimal landings and discards for (s, t) combinations, prices p, w and landing restrictions, l.
Variable profits, also quasi-rent to the vessel capital, captain and crew labor shares, marginal
costs etc. are also calculated in our investigation and predictions of fishing behavior.
Our baseline simulation assumes a 40 foot vessel and prices equal to the mean of the sample
data. We impose a per-trip landings of constraint of 5,000 pounds. The date chosen for the
baseline simulation is the midpoint of the 2006 fishing season. Regulations in 2006 included
red snapper landing limits under the endorsement program and closures for grouper species.
Our baseline scenario assumes a 2,000 pound red snapper landings constraint. The effects of
a grouper closure are considered separately.
Variable profits per trip vary around $5,000-$7,000 over much of the Gulf. Lowest variable
profits are indicated in the far western regions of the fishery. Red snapper is a key species in
the western region, and is the highest priced among the seven targeted species, averaging $3.19
per pound landed. The 2,000 pound landings limit however constraints the profit potential for
this species.22 If we run the model without the 2,000 pound limit on red snapper landings, the
variable profits flatten out at roughly $10,000 per trip across all subregions of the fishery.
The model predicts that the 2,000 pound red snapper landings constraint binds in all
subregions of the fishery. In the western and central subregions the remaining 3,000 pounds
of landed fish is made up of vermilion snapper and gag grouper, with a smaller amount of
Other Species landed in subregions 18-21. In eastern subregions a smaller amount of vermilion
snapper is landed and no landings of Other species are recorded. Remaining landings are
comprised largely of gag grouper and red grouper in subregions 3-7. Targeting of red snapper
and gag grouper is explained by the relatively high dockside prices for these species, which
are set a $3.19 and $3.10 per landed pound respectively in the baseline case. The remaining
variation in targeting behavior is due to spatial variation in targeting costs as measured, as
measured by ϕst. The fitted lowest-target-cost share for red snapper exceeds 0.70 in the far
22Fishing vessels are mobile and we would expect to see only small variation in per-trip profits across space.
The higher returns in the eastern region do not reflect the impacts of periodic grouper closures. Moreover a vessel
with a 200 pound endorsement permits, or no red snapper landings permit will have a different earning profile.
Taking these considerations into accout, we can conclude that profit opportunities do not vary substantially
with s..
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western subregions of the fishery, and declines monotonically toward the eastern subregions.
Interaction between the 2,000 pound red snapper landing limit and ϕst explains the decline in
variable profits for s > 14.
The model predicts median red snapper discards that range from 200 pounds in subregion 16
to 550 pounds in subregion 20. Discarding red snapper occurs when optimal harvests exceed
the 2,000 pound landing limit. Under the weak output disposibility technology, discarding
avoids the targeting costs that would otherwise be required to harvest only what is landed.
With fitted values of ϕi,st in western subregions s = 16− 20 well above 0.50, harvesting 2,000
pound of red snapper on a 5,000 pound trip requires costly targeting. The model suggesting
discarding overages is preferred.
The model predicts fairly substantial discards of Other species, h7 (as high as 1,500 pounds
in subregions 1-4). These discards arise because of the per-trip landings constraint assumed in
the baseline simulation. At 5,000 pounds total landings, estimated variable profit margins for
landed species at roughly $1.12 per pound, whereas marginal profits for Other species is less
than $1.
When we simulate harvest behavior without the 2,000 pound red snapper landings con-
straint optimal landings are comprised almost entirely of red snapper. Only in subregions 5-8
are positive landings of gag grouper indicated. Red snapper discards are zero in the absence of
the red snapper landings constraint, although discards of Other species and vermilion snapper
are indicated. It should be emphasized that the predicted discards arise due to the total trip
landings constraint assumed in the baseline model.
Our second simulation examines seasonal effects on harvest behavior and variable trip
profits. We solve for optimal harvests and discards on a trip that originates January 1, 2006.
Prices are unchanged from the baseline levels, and the 2,000 pound limit on red snapper
landings remains in place.
Economic and regulatory conditions are unchanged in the second simulation. The model
predicts differences in the landings mix, discards, and profits due to the seasonal variation in
the minimum-target-cost harvest vector ϕst. We also find that winter fishing earns slightly
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lower variable profits in the western subregions, but yields between 2-5% higher profits in the
eastern subregions. We also find that optimal landings mix in the winter includes larger shares
of vermilion snapper in the central subregions and larger shares of gag grouper throughout the
Gulf.
Our empirical estimation reveals that ϕi,st for red snapper and gag grouper exhibit summer
troughs or winter peaks. Thus the harvest vector that minimizes targeting costs will be com-
prised of larger shares of red snapper and gag grouper during winter fishing. The model also
predicts an increase in the harvest of red snapper. However, under the 2,000 pound landings
limit, overages are discarded at sea. The model predicts that in the western subregions of the
fishery, winter discards of red snapper are 200-700 pounds higher than during summer fishing.
In a third simulation we reduce the red snapper price by 25% below the baseline value (of
$3.19 per pound). Panel (c) reports the percentage change, decline, in variable profits across
subregions. The results indicate variable profit declines in the range of 14%-18% in western
subregions and 12%-13% in eastern subregions. The mix of landed species is unchanged in
western subregions 13-21. This is explained by the importance of red snapper in the western
Gulf. In the east however the model predicts that a 25% drop in the red snapper price has
important implications for targeting behavior. Under the lower red snapper price, red snapper
landings decline in subregions 1-12. Eastern Gulf fishermen land instead larger quantities of
vermilion snapper, red grouper, and gag grouper. Our model predicts that the red snapper
price decline does not significantly alter discarding behavior.
A fourth simulation considers the effects of a closure of the red and gag grouper fisheries.
The results find that the closure policy causes reductions in variable profits vary widely across
subregions. Losses are greatest, in excess of 10%, in subregions 4-9 which is considered to be
the heart of the grouper fishery. Losses are smaller in the central region where shallow water
groupers are a less important target species, and increase again in the western region where
high-priced gag groupers comprise a important share of landings. The results indicate that
when the red and gag grouper fisheries close, landings of vermilion snapper (h2) and deep water
groupers and tilefishes (h5) increase. Not surprisingly, the model predicts positive discards of
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red grouper in subregions 5-7, i.e., when red grouper landings are prohibited fishermen can
either incur added costs to avoid them or discard the red grouper intercepted by their gear.
The results reported above by no means exhaust the economic and regulatory impacts that
can be examined by our model. We consider in a fifth simulation exercise the impact of an
increase in the price of fuel. The annual average fuel price in our data rose from $2.27 in
2005 to $3.75 in 2008, and it is therefore reasonable to expect that fuel prices affected the
reef fish targeting behavior in our data. The simulations find that a 40% fuel price increase
reduced per-trip variable profits by 5%-10% relative to baseline levels. The model predicts
that higher fuel prices impact targeting behavior. We find that the median targeting cost
component,
[
1 +mi=1 γv (θi − ϕi,st)2
]
decline by 2%-5% depending on the subregion under the
higher fuel price. Intuitively, targeting efforts will be dampened under higher fuel prices and
the optimal harvest share will more closely mirror the minimum-target-cost vector ϕst. This
is because adjusting the harvest mix in response to price differentials at the dock becomes
more costly when the fuel price rises. Our simulations indicate, for example, that landings of
gag are reduced by 200-300 pounds across the fishery. Landings of vermilion snapper increase
primarily in the central subregions and landings of red grouper increase under in subregions
2-7. The model predicts, also rather intuitively, that at-sea discards decline under high fuel
prices.
Recall that the empirical specification for ϕst includes a time index y to capture longer
term trends in stocks conditions in the fishery. This allows us to examine longer term trends in
targeting behavior. Simulations that varied y for example, from 2005 through 2008, indicated
only minor changes in variable profits and targeting behavior. The results are not reported
here.
We construct a final simulation to examine the changes in fishing behavior that accompanied
a switch from controlled access to individual transferable quotas (ITQs) for red snapper. To
represent this policy switch we introduce a quota user cost which we assume arbitrarily to be
equal to 50% of the baseline red snapper price, and drop the 2,000 pound landing constraint.
Under ITQs trip limits on landings are no longer required; landings are restricted only at the
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seasonal level by the aggregate ITQ holdings of the vessel operation. We evaluate optimal
harvests and discards for a mid 2007 season trip, which was the first year of the red snapper
ITQ program.
First, the results indicate a reduction in trip variable profits ranging from 15% in eastern
subregions and increasing to 33% in western subregions.23 The reduction in variable profits
or capital quasi rents conforms with theoretical predictions, that property rights-based man-
agement programs provide incentives to reduce oversized fishing fleets. An important results
for managers, however relates to the stark variability in losses across regions. Because tar-
geting costs vary across subregions, substitute target species and red snapper fishing costs do
as well. Our model suggests that introducing ITQ for a single species in a multiple-species
fishery can significantly alter harvests and discards of species managed under the status quo.
In particular, our model predicts that red snapper landings increase above the 2,000 pounds in
the far western subregions. Vermilion snapper landings also increase in subregions 10-17 where
these two species tend to be harvest complements. The addition of the red snapper quota
rental substantially lowers the residual price for fishermen at the dock. Our model predicts
that eastern landings of red snapper fall to zero when a quota rental is introduced; optimal
landings instead include substantially higher shares of vermilion snapper, gag grouper and red
grouper.
A less anticipated impact on fishing behavior is a predicted increase in red snapper discards.
Results indicate positive red snapper discards in subregions 7-16, ranging from 150 pounds per
trip to over 1,000 pounds per trip (subregions 13 and 14). This result is due to the 5,000 pound
per-trip landings constraint. At a substantially reduced red snapper price and a 5,000 pound
trip limit on landings, the marginal profit from landing red snapper falls below marginal profits
from landing other species such as vermilion snapper and red and gag groupers.
23Looses in variable profits are offset by increases in resource rents generated under the red snapper ITQ
program. These rents would be determined as the quota rental times the total red snapper landings.
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4.6 Conclusions
We have introduces a new approach for studying spatial-temporal fishing behavior in marine
fisheries. We estimate a structural behavioral model that provides a direct link from the in
situ fish stock, prices and species-specific regulations, to outcomes of interest to managers, e.g.,
species-specific harvests, discards and fishing profits. A parametric cost function and Kuhn
Tucker necessary conditions for profit maximizing targeting of multiple fish species under
landings restrictions is specified for estimation. Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods are
used to simulate the posterior likelihood function. We estimate a latent, lowest-target-cost
harvest share vector that summarizes the costly targeting technology and corresponding profit
opportunities for fishermen across space and time. The fitted model is used to predict the
effects of changes in economic conditions and regulations on spatial and temporal landings,
discards, and fishing profits in the Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery.
Our results demonstrate complex interactions between the economic and regulatory envi-
ronment and the multiple-species harvesting behavior of Gulf reef fish fishermen. Not surpris-
ingly, we find that per-trip landings limits used to control aggregate fishing mortality redirect
fishing effort toward unregulated species, in pattern that vary spatially with stock conditions.
We are also able to investigate the effects of model fundamentals on the incentives to discard
fish at sea.
Several policy lessons emerge from our analysis of the Gulf reef fish fishery. For example,
replacing controlled access management with individual fishing quotas for a single species, is
likely to redirect effort toward species without a quota rental, and may enhance incentives to
discard fish at sea. We also find, not surprisingly, that closures for individual species cause
fishermen to substitute toward unregulated species, and can enhance incentives to discard fish.
Less obvious findings relate to the impact of increased fuel prices on targeting and discard
behavior. Our model predicts that when the price of fuel rises, Gulf reef fish fishermen may be
inclined to target higher priced species, and more willing to land a mix of species that moderates
targeting costs. On the flip side, targeting is enhanced and at-sea discards will increase when
fuel prices decline. Overall the results demonstrate the need to consider behavioral responses
79
and policy design inclusive of the complete biological, economic and regulatory environment
of marine fisheries.
An important attribute of our model is that optimal responses of fishermen to varying
economic and other regulatory conditions is incorporated explicitly. Our results demonstrate
clearly the benefits of a structural approach for policy analysis. Moreover, because we are
able to link fishing behavior directly to stock conditions, prices and regulations, the model is
ideally suited to investigate ex ante impact of alternative forms of regulations. Methods based
on the discrete choice RUM framework require a second layer model to complete the link
from fundamentals to trip-level behavior. Our approach avoids discretizing the fishing ground
and/or the choice set of fishing inputs and outputs; our approach provides a rich framework to
characterize fishing behavior at any spatial or temporal scale. Taken together these attributes
suggest that our model can be a powerful tool to improve the design of fisheries management
policies.
For example, our model can guide the design of fishery closure policies, property rights-
based management, marine reserves, etc. Designing a system of marine reserves requires
knowledge of trade-offs between ecological preservation across a spatially heterogeneous fishing
ground and pursuit of economic rents. Our model measures directly, the short term cost, or
foregone profits of closing subregions of a fishery. A useful extension of our model would link
our costly targeting technology, and our lowest-target-cost share vector, to measures of absolute
stock abundance. This would allow a fully dynamic analysis of spatial behavior and spatial
management policies. Evaluating changes in stock abundance in areas surrounding marine
protected areas, and stock effects due to large scale redistribution of fishing effort across space
and time are examples.
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSION
These three essays by considering the management of fisheries, the trade of genetically
modified and the financing of agricultural producers show how wide are the fields of application
of microeconomics and how useful is its intellectual framework in providing insights to applied
questions. Furthermore this thesis makes several contributions to the literature.
The first essay shows how the capacity of enforcing intellectual property rights by a country
establishes its adoption and labeling regime of the products of the biotechnology. This result
to the best of our knowledge is new and provides relevant insights on the regulatory responses
to the genetically modified technology by developing countries.
The second essay demonstrates that by bundling several tasks within its procurement
organization the supermarket reduces agency rent. This reduction in agency rent is conducive
of credit extension and thereby a larger participation in the marketing channel. This result is
also to the best of our knowledge new and contributes to the literature on microfinance.
Finally the framework developed in the last essay by combining the economic and ecologic
approaches in the analysis of fishermen behaviors and fish stocks dynamic should contribute
to the improvement of the fishery management.
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APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
A.1 Prior specifications
With the exception of the targeting skill parameter, all priors are assumed to be diffused.
A hierarchical prior captures heterogeneity in fishing skill. We assume
γv ∼ N
(
γ¯, σ2γ
)
. (A.1)
Following standard methods (e.g., Chib and Carlin, 1999) we use conventional conjugate priors
for the hyperparameters of this distribution, i.e.,
σ2γ ∼ IG (2.5, 3) , (A.2)
γ¯ ∼ N (0, 1000) ; (A.3)
in the above IG(.) and N(.) denote the inverse gamma and normal distribution, respectively.
A.1.1 Random Walk M-H Algorithm
Here we simply present the Random Walk Metropolis Hastings (RWMH) algorithm. For
further details on the Metropolis-Hastings (M-H) algorithm we refer the reader to (Chib, and
Greenberg, 1995). The M-H algorithm is similar in spirit to acceptance/rejection sampling
and consists in three steps:
1. At iteration ω, sample a candidate value for the parameters from a candidate density
q∗ω ∼ δ (q|qω−1) (A.4)
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2. Draw a random number u such that
u ∼ U (0, 1) (A.5)
3. Accept or reject the candidate based on the following decision rule. Let
a =
φ (q∗ω|.) δ (qω−1|q∗ω)
φ (qω−1|.) δ (q∗ω|qω−1)
(A.6)
where φ (q|.) denotes the posterior distribution of q according to the data. Then if u ≤ a, set
qω = q
∗
ω otherwise qω = qω−1.
In the RWMH algorithm the candidate density is normal so that
q∗ω ∼ N
(
qω−1, σ2q
)
. (A.7)
In the above, σ2q is the variance os spread of the normal distribution. The main idea behind
the M-H algorithm is to replicate the stationary property of the Markov chain. Indeed a can
be interpreted as the ”jump” probability from one candidate to the next. This probability is
pending on the value of the spread. The art of the RWMH algorithm dwells in setting the value
of this spread. We follow the recommendation of Gelman and Gilks (1995) and specify the
spreads of our candidate generating density so that the acceptance rate is close to 50 percent
for single valued parameters and between 25 and 50 percent for multi-valued parameters.
A.1.2 Estimation algorithm
We use a Gibbs sampler to simulate draws from the posterior of the joint posterior density.
The following algorithm describes the procedure.
Using the Gibbs sampler we repeatedly cycle through each conditional density, drawing
from each one in turn. When the number of cycles grows large, the draws converge in distri-
bution to that of the complete joint posterior (Gelfand and Smith, 1990). Our Gibbs sampler
consists of seven steps or ”blocks”.
Step 1: β|Γ−β, Z As this posterior conditional is of unknown form we use the RWMH
algorithm explained above. For further reference Γ−β indicates the entire set of parameters
less the parameter β.
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Step 2: Σ|Γ−Σ, Z.
